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Abstract
What factors have led to successful outcomes in international peace operations
conducted in Sub Saharan African countries? What factors explain mission failure? I
proposed a basic theory of peace operations that linked conflict conditions to mandate
design to the capability of an intervening force deployed for mission implementation
developed from arguments and empirical results of previous research.
Data on 86 peace operations that occurred in 23 African states covering 33
separate conflict periods between 1990 and 2015 was analyzed. My main findings
showed that mandates were derived from conflict assessments and determined the size of
intervening force required. The results also indicated that neither the size of an
intervening force, nor the lead-organization, nor mandate robustness (offensive
deterrence capacity), nor sequencing of operations were predictors of mission success or
failure. However, implementation forces that included parallel support operations and/or
mission assistance from Western great powers had higher levels of successful outcomes.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The Issue
Peace operations are designed as international interventions that seek to protect
and enhance security within countries. They include a variety of missions: factfinding/observation (peace monitoring), support of existing peace agreements (traditional
peacekeeping), peace enforcement, and multi-dimensional peace building. These can
generally be categorized as either facilitative missions seeking to contain conflict or
transformational missions seeking to resolve a conflict (Sambanis, 2008). All peace
operations aim to abate conflict and are legitimized through the United Nations Charter
(Diehl & Druckman, 2015).
The idea of international peace operations is not new. The 1945 United Nations
Charter provided guidelines that have been used to address threats to security: Chapter VI
deals with the “Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” Chapter VII contains provisions related
to “Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression,”
and Chapter VIII outlines the role of regional arrangements and agencies in the ensuring
international peace and security. However, the charter did not specifically mention peace
observation and peacekeeping was not yet created. Peace operations evolved through ad
hoc responses to international crises. Growth was slow throughout the Cold War.
Deadlock in the Security Council limited opportunities for international intervention.
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Peace operations began to proliferate after 1989 and in 1992 the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was formed in the UN (Autesserre, 2019).
Since 1990, the number of peace operations and the number of participating
country intervenors has increased dramatically. More peace operations occurred in the
four-year period following the end of the Cold War, 1990-1994, than in the previous fifty
years (Williams, 2016). However, support for peace operations declined drastically
following the 1993 Battle for Mogadishu in Somalia. The 1994 Rwandan Genocide
reawakened the world to the importance of engagement, but not before the loss of nearly
a million lives. International support for peace operations accelerated after 2001 as great
powers increased funding in an effort to limit global instabilities rising from intrastate
conflict.
Today more than 50% of United Nations peace operations take place in Africa
(Karlsrud, 2018). African peace operations have increased in complexity over time. In
the 1990s, mission mandates were mainly to observe and monitor conflict conditions in
unstable countries. A primary actor, the African Regional Economic Communities
(RECs), was generally not successful in efforts to make or keep peace (Williams, 2016).
The African Union (AU) formed in 2002, emphasized the need to promote peace,
security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of social and economic
development. The AU’s African Peace and Security Architecture design sought to unify
the process for intervening in African states. Later, most missions became
multidimensional, seeking to focus not only to prevent bloodshed, but also on building
positive peace.
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Peace operation missions have grown increasingly large, costly, and complex.
Simultaneously, they have become more successful at building lasting peace (Fortna,
2004; 2008; Williams, 2016). However, success has not been ubiquitous and results are
mixed. Some operations achieved measurable milestones while others did not. Why
have peace operations in Namibia, Mozambique, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Liberia, the
Comoros, and Cote d’Ivoire succeeded while those in Rwanda, Angola, Sudan, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, and others, failed?
Support for UN missions in Darfur and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
was reduced based on limited performance achievements. The UN High Level
Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) convened 2014-2015 to undertake a
thorough review of UN peace operations with the assistance of the Norwegian Institute of
International Affairs (NUPI), to resolve issues relating to the establishment of empirical
data on peace operations’ success and support. The outcome has been a call for
researchers to develop a systematic data set to inform and support policy makers (de
Coning & Drange, 2017).
A study on the interplay between the dimensions of a conflict; the mandate
directing the operation; and characteristics and capabilities of the intervening force
contributes to this call for action. Construction of peace operation forces for particular
missions has been ad hoc and based on who is willing to serve rather than selecting the
best and most appropriate units to perform and achieve mission objectives. This
construction process has resulted in a major challenge: matching intervenor capacities to
mission requirements. More than 80 peace operations were active in Sub-Saharan Africa
3

between 1990 and 2015. States, regional communities, non-African organizations, the
African Union, the United Nations, and other groups have created and supported these
interventions.
This thesis began with an observation that the ad hoc nature of peace operation
construction in Africa is not random. Operational construction has followed patterns that
evolve over time in response to factors as disparate as the domestic politics of great
powers, the nature of conflicts themselves, and in response to internal shifts within
international organizations. These operations have had disparate results. Some
operations such as UNTAG in Namibia have performed exceptionally well bringing
lasting peace to conflicted societies. Other operations such as OMIB in Burundi have
performed their mandated tasks yet failed to produce peace. Some have produced a
temporary peace (UNAMIR II in Rwanda), and others have failed to establish any peace,
withdrawing in the face of increased violence (UNOSOM II in Somalia). Why do some
peace operations succeed where others fail? What factors influence the ability of a peace
operation to address the issues endemic in a conflict? Where are these factors found?
Are they in the mandates that direct forces employed and attempt to address the issues
endemic to the conflict, are they found in the capabilities of the forces that are employed
to carry out the tasks directed by the mandate, or do both pieces impact the overall
success or failure of a peace operation? This thesis explores these relationships and their
effects on the outcome and impact of peace operations in post-Cold War Sub Saharan
Africa.

4

Previous Research
Peace operations have generated positive results. Intervened conflicts are
resolved at higher rates and have greater rates of peace resiliency than non-intervened
conflicts (Fortna, 2008; Sambanis, 2008). However, scholarship addressing the question
“what factors impact the success or failure of a peace operation?” points to a diverse
range of answers. Some studies focus on intervenor composition or characteristics: who
are the intervenors, where they come from, and how they are trained. Bellamy and
Williams (2013) argue that finding capable forces is a challenge to peace operations
success; the UN can often recruit the required numbers of soldiers but as a group they
may not have the necessary capabilities. Jett (1999) finds that operation failure is often
caused by poorly trained forces. He cites instances of failure in Angola and Mozambique
caused by soldiers who were unable to drive the equipment provided to them and shared
no common language with the region in which they were deployed. Daniel (2013)
similarly finds that most UN peacekeepers come from nations in the bottom third of
spending per soldier. In summary, these studies find that the success of peace operations
is effected by their struggle to meet capability needs even in the face of an adequate
number of troops.
Daniel (2013) and Martin-Brule (2012) examine the means to mitigate mission
failure resulting from a lack of troop capabilities in UN “partnered missions,” that
combine a traditional UN operation with the deployment of soldiers from a western or
regional power to borrow advanced technical capabilities. Martin-Brule (2012) finds that
the involvement of political or military representatives from one of the permanent
5

members of the UN Security Council is key forces without major power support lack
credibility and are unable to gain cooperation from belligerent parties.
The numerical density of peacekeepers per geographic unit or per population is
not a significant factor for success. Fortna (2008) ruled the numbers irrelevant; finding
instead that the mission’s very existence is key. According to Fortna, the mission will
either be large enough to perform the task or will serve as a trip-wire to an organization
that can. Sambanis (2008) comes to a similar conclusion, that the quantity of peace
keepers has an insignificant impact on mission success. But, the former head of UN
Peacekeeping, Jean-Marie Guehenno, argues that a mission can only succeed when
troops are sufficient in numbers and capabilities in relation to mission needs (cited in
Berdal, 2016). Similarly, Badmus (2015) finds that most failures of AU and UN
missions in Africa have been due to insufficient funding, troop numbers, and support to
troops in the field. Discussions on the correct “right-sizing” of mission personnel are
ongoing.
The role of mandate and doctrine on the success or failure of peace operations is
not clear. Some research finds the success of peace operations to be hamstrung by
mandates not matched to conflict conditions. Other argues that success is dependent on
robust empowering mandates. The argument that peace operations are destined to fail by
ineffective or inappropriate mandates is focused on the selection of appropriate mandates.
Holmqvist (2014) states that interventions designed by liberal regimes seek to produce
clones of themselves. Therefore, peace operations are by nature ill-conceived ventures.
Rhoads (2016) similarly finds fault in many mandates, arguing that robust mandates
6

exceed the logical limits of peacekeeping. Robust intervenors become an additional
belligerent in the conflict. This status deprives intervenors of legitimacy and stands in
the way of success (Nascimento, 2018). Fiedler (2000) concludes the consent of the
parties is the most important element. He argues, more robust mandates are inappropriate
as they violate the principle of consent.
Unclear or vague mandates may condemn peace operations to failure. de Coning,
Aoi, and Karlsrud (2017) find that the UN is hamstrung by a lack of coherent vision and
concrete direction in peace operations. Williams (2016) argues that intervening forces
are often given vague orders, but also contradictory guidance. Missions deployed in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and South Sudan instructed peacekeepers to
simultaneously help governments extend their authority and protect civilians with the full
knowledge that the governments were among the greatest perpetrators of violence against
civilians.
Some scholars hold the key to success lies in more robust multidimensional or
peace enforcement mandates that emanate from chapter VII of the UN Charter and do not
require host nation consent (United Nations, 2018). Sandler’s (2017) research supports
the conclusion that multidimensional missions have achieved a higher success rate due to
their focus on issues foundational to the conflict. Sambanis’ (2008) findings indicate a
robust mandate is the key to success. Similarly, Thakur’s (2014) reading of the Brahimi
Report finds that credible force is the keystone. The over emphasis of neutrality in
mandates has led to timidity in the face of human rights violations (Hultman, 2014).
Therefore, timidity of troops in the field is an effect of poor mandates. This is echoed by
7

NATO doctrine that states that intervenors can experience feelings of impotence due to
limited rules of engagement. The findings of this group argue that robust mandates and
rules of engagement lead to credible peace interventions.
Other findings hold that conflict specific factors have the greatest effect on peace
mission success or failure, where an understanding of the conflict environment is key to
overall mission achievement. According to Dennys (2014) conflict dynamics can only be
understood by local actors. Therefore, outside interventions are more likely to have
negative than positive outcomes. Mobekk (2017) argues that the failure of multiple
missions to Haiti was caused by a weak comprehension of local political factors.
Essentially because local actors caused the conflict, they are responsible for conflict
resolution. Whalan (2013) finds the intervenor’s ability to obtain local compliance and
cooperation as the key. Mission efficacy requires peacekeepers must have power to
influence local actors and local actors must respect the legitimacy of peacekeepers for the
mission. Peace operations fail when intervenors attempt to impose a standard response
template onto a conflict. Howard (2007) also focuses on the interplay between intervenor
and conflict parties, noting that mission success depends on the extent that the
peacekeepers learn from local actors: rigid implementation of missions from above
causes certain failure while integrating lessons and direction from below leads to success.
Fortna (2008) and Karlsrud (2018) argue that the success or failure of a peace
operation is determined by the match of the mission to the conflict’s political economy.
Fortna’s recommendations use conflict ripeness theory to move the belligerents towards
peace (Zartman, 2003). She argues that peace is best achieved by increasing the cost of
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violence and financially incentivizing peace. Karlsrud (2018) argues that failures are
caused by the international community’s preference to work with states over rebel
groups. Communities in conflict may receive more services and support from rebel
groups than from their own legitimate government. Therefore, to shift the power balance
toward the government is to ignore the political economy that drives the conflict.
Similarly, Westendorf (2015) finds that intervenors view peace as a technical problem
and so overlook the underlying political and economic factors that have created the
conflict. The focus becomes the views and interests of the elite that inadvertently causes
the extension and entrenchment of the conflict (Tardy, 2017). These authors all agree
that getting the local dynamics right is more likely to result in a successful peace
operation mission.
Other scholars point to the primacy of regional factors in determining the success
or failure of a peace operation. Regional states can serve as spoilers by allowing arms
shipments into a conflict zone or facilitating a profitable illicit flow of raw materials out
of the conflict zone (Jett, 1999). van der Lijn’s (2010) study states that the failure is
inevitable without the cooperation of regional actors. UN, NATO, and other institutional
doctrine all emphasizes the importance of positive involvement of regional actors as
intervenors (Garb, 2014).
Most studies agree on the utility of peace operations (Dorussen, 2014).
Researchers find answers to the success or failure of a peace operation in analysis of the
conflict environment, the operation’s mandate, or intervenor composition and capacity.
Surprisingly, intervening force troop numeric strength has been found to be irrelevant to
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predicting mission success (Fortna, 2008). Additionally, there is no clear understanding
of the interplay between the dimensions of a conflict; the mandate directing the purpose
and objectives of a peace operation mission; and the characteristics of capability defining
and constituting the intervening force. The disparity of findings has failed to produce
usable data to policy makers in several key areas (de Coning & Drange, 2017). The
proposed study is designed to address some of these issues.
The Argument
What is the relationship between the characteristics of a conflict, the peace
operation mandate designed to reduce violence, and the intervenor characteristics in
determining the outcome of such international engagements? This question is examined
by analyzing post-Cold War peace operations (1990-2015) in Sub-Saharan African
countries1. My argument is that mandates are developed in direct response to the conflict
environment and will be successful when carried out by a capable intervening force.
Peace operations will have higher rates of success when mandates are properly
constructed and staffed by sufficiently trained and equipped forces. The basic theory of
peace operations is diagrammed in Figure 1.

1

This study utilizes the United Kingdom Government’s parameters for defining the Sub-Saharan Africa
region. This definition includes all independent countries on the African continent excepting the northern
states of Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. Also included are the island states of Madagascar,
Mauritius, and the Comoros (DFID, 2006). Thus defined, the region comprises forty-six states in 2015.
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Figure 1.1. Basic Theory of Peace Operations

Conflict
Conditions

Addressed
by mandate
design

Mandates

Peace results from
appropriate
mandates and
capable intervenors

Carried out
by
intervenor
Forces

Execute mandated
tasks to ameliorate
conflict conditions

Intervenor
Forces

Conflict
Outcome

My hypotheses are crafted to challenge the assumptions of this model. I assume
that the nature of a conflict dictates the mandate that determines the required force
capabilities. The chain leading to failure can therefore be the result of a mandate that
does not address the conflict issues or a force capacity that cannot fulfill the mandate’s
requirements. It follows that mission success requires the appropriate match of
intervenor capabilities to mandate requirements to conflict situation. Nine hypotheses
will be tested to evaluate different elements of this chain.
This study will analyze both the ability of the intervention force to accomplish its
mandated tasks, this mission’s overall effects on the conflict, and its relation to other
peace operations. The key questions are: did the intervention force produce peace, did it
transition from or to another operation, and what was the overall success of the peace
operation in addressing the conflict (specifically did the conflict end with no reoccurrence
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within five years?). Cases with similar outcomes will be analyzed to identify common
points of failure or success and focus on how the intervening forces played a role in peace
operation outcomes.
Outline of Thesis
This thesis is composed of five chapters. The introduction first chapter provides a
review of peace operation literature and presents the basis argument about peace
operation success. The second chapter examines the history and evolution of conflicts
and peace operations in Sub-Saharan Africa. Chapter two provides an overview of all
post-World War II wars and all post-Cold War interventions into Sub-Saharan Africa.
Conflict trends, international organization actions, mission trends, and great power
actions are all discussed. Different models of operational change and support are
examined in detail. Collectively, the first two chapters establish the background
information that informed the design of my analysis.
Chapter three discusses the research design. The chapter details my conflictmandate-intervenor conceptual model of peace operations. Next, data collection, variable
selection, analysis method, are all explained. The chapter explains the manner that
qualitative analysis will test hypotheses linking mandate selection to conflict
characteristics and intervenor characteristics to mandate type.
Chapter four and five are devoted to empirical findings and conclusions draw
from these findings. Chapter four tests links between conflict, mandate, and intervenor in
the search for patterns that produce greater incidences of resilient peace. The chapter
explains the raw outputs and highlights those variables found to be significant. Chapter
12

five summarizes my findings and analyzes how this research aligns with other
scholarship or departs from previous research results.
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CHAPTER TWO: AFRICAN CONFLICTS AND PEACE OPERATIONS: A
DESCRIPTION
Conflict in Individual States
Post-World War II conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa have been dominated by the
question for independence followed by the struggle to maintain sovereignty once gained.
Sub-Saharan Africa in 1950 had only three independent states; Ethiopia, Liberia, and
South Africa. Ghana and Guinea increased the total to five by the end of the 1950s. The
1960s and 70s saw a dramatic uptick in independence as France and other European
powers moved away from colonization. Djibouti was the last country to gain
independence from a European power; gaining its independence from France in 1977.
Other Sub-Saharan nations have gained their independence from other African powers;
Namibia became independent from South Africa in 1990; Eritrea from Ethiopia in 1993;
and most recently South Sudan from Sudan in 2011 (DFID, 2006).
The purpose of this chapter is twofold: first, to provide an overview of violence
and wars within sub-Saharan African countries in order to highlight the magnitude of
conflict in this region; and second, to describe specific international peace operations in
Africa that were organized to reduce conflict intensity and/or resolve conflict.
Self-determination conflicts have been ubiquitous in the post-World War II
history of Sub-Saharan Africa. Eight of the 43 nations in Sub-Saharan Africa were
engaged in self-determination conflicts at the time of independence, another 11 erupted
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into conflict in the immediate aftermath of independence, and a further 9 experienced
similar conflicts after the initial post-independence phase. Therefore, in total 28 of 43
nations in question experienced self-determination conflicts according to Department for
International Development (DFID). These conflicts took place before, during, and after
independence. The belligerents have struggled for independence from colonial powers
and from governments that they felt did not represent their group or interests. The
Correlates of War (COW) data defines “war” by the standard of 1,000 deaths per annum.
By their criteria, the record shows that 70 wars have occurred in 27 Sub-Saharan African
states between 1945 and 2015. A brief outline of conflicts (and fatalities) in these
countries is presented drawing on data and narratives from the COW collection (Sarkees
& Wayman, 2010). Descriptions of peace operations follow.
Angola
Conflicts. Several separate periods of violent conflict occurred in Angola. First,
the war of independence (1961-1974) that concluded with an end to 400 years of
Portuguese colonial rule. There were 25,000 Angolan and 4,000 Portuguese battlerelated deaths. Second, The Angola Guerrilla War (1974-75) between three groups, the
Marxist Popular Movement for the Rebellion of Angola (MPLA), the National front for
the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA). No reliable estimates for battle deaths exist for this conflict (Sarkees &
Wayman, 2010). Third, the War Over Angola (1975-76) involving South African troops
(supporting UNITA) and Cuban troops (supporting MPLA) that resulted in 2,700 battle
deaths. Fourth, the Angolan Control War (1976-1991) between UNITA, FMLA, and
15

MPLA, that led to approximately 150,000 casualties. Fifth, the Angolan War of the
Cities (1992-1994) caused an estimated 500,000 total deaths (Mullenbach, 2018).
Finally, another war with 25,000 battle-related deaths occurred between 1998-2002
ending with MPLA government victory and a peace agreement that has been sustained.
Peace Operations. Four peace operations took place in Angola during the
Angolan Control War, 1976-1991, and the Angolan War of the Cities, 1992-1994. The
UN led all four operations. The 70-person United Nations Angola Verification Mission I
(UNAVEM I) was a peace monitoring operation beginning in January of 1989 and
ending in June of 1991. UNAVEM I was tasked with observing the withdrawal of Cuban
forces from Angola. The mission transitioned to the 718-person peacekeeping
UNAVEM II mission following the signing of a cease-fire. UNAVEM II operated from
June of 1991 to February of 1995. The operation was tasked with ceasefire observance,
police development, and election observation. UNAVEM II transitioned to the 4,220person peacekeeping operation UNAVEM III in response to the February 1995 signing of
the Lusaka protocol peace agreement. UNAVEM III monitored the military mobilization
and observed the transition of UNITA from an armed movement into a political party.
UNAVEM III then transitioned to the 2,773 peacekeeping UN Observer Mission in
Angola (MONUA) in June of 1997. MONUA was disbanded in March 1999 in response
to conflict resurgence. Eventual peace in Angola was unrelated to the efforts of any of
the four peace operations (Mullenbach, 2018).
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Burundi
Conflicts. Three wars developed between the two dominant ethnic groups: Tutsis
and Hutus in their quest for governmental control. The first conflict in 1972 lasted a few
weeks and resulted in 2,000 battle related deaths. The second, (1993-1998) led to 50,000
civilian deaths, plus an unknown number of direct combatant casualties. The third war
(2001-2003) left an estimated 300,000 people dead.
Peace Operations. Burundi played host to five peace operations covering the
Second, 1991-1998, and Third, 2001-2003, Burundi Wars. The 47 personnel OAU
Observer Mission in Burundi (OMIB) monitored the Second Burundi War from
December 1993 to July 1996. The mission withdrew in 1996 due to the financial burden
of mission support. The Second Burundi War continued for nearly three years after
OMIB’s withdrawal (Pan African News Agency, 1997).
Three peace operations supported the peace process of the Third Burundi War.
The 750-person peace enforcement South African Protection Service Detachment
(SAPSD) supported the peace process by ensuring the security of Burundi leaders from
October 2001 to August 2009. SAPSD began as a standalone mission, transitioned to a
support mission to the peacekeeping African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), and returned to
a standalone mission. The AU led 3,029-person AMIB was installed in support of a
cease fire and tasked with preventing a resurgence of violence. AMIB conducted
operations February 2003 to June 2004 before transitioning to the 6,352-person
peacebuilding UN Mission in Burundi (ONUB) following the peace agreement signing.
ONUB provided security, assisted with disarmament, ensured election security, and
17

developed institutions from June 2004 to December 2006. SAPSD continued its duties
following ONUB’s withdrawal. It finally withdrew in August 2009 after ensuring
continuing security for elected leaders through Burundi’s post-war transition period
(Nantulya, 2016 ). Burundi’s peace remained resilient after the departure of all peace
operations.
Central African Republic
Conflicts. The Central African Republic has been plagued by conflicts and
struggles for control be they religious, ethnic, or otherwise since its independence from
France in 1960. These conflicts resulted in incalculable deaths and several nondemocratic changes of power. The Central African Republic War (2012 to 2013) is the
only episode in which this violence reached the level of war. Multiple Muslim majority
rebel groups combined to form the Séléka Coalition. They were opposed by Christian
majority Anti-Balaka forces. The conflict resulted in the collapse of multiple
governments and more than 6,300 battle related deaths (Uppsala Conflict Data Program,
2018). The conflict continues to the present at a less than war level (Mullenbach, 2018).
Peace Operations. The Central African Republic has hosted three separate series
of peace operations. The first in a time of less than warfare violence, the second failed to
prevent the onset of war, and the third series was deployed to allay violence of the
Central African Republic War.
The first period of intervention began in February 1997 and extended until
February 2000. The 800-person Inter-African Force in the Central African Republic
(MISAB) conducted operations from February 1997 to April 1998. MISAB was a peace
18

enforcement operation to stabilize the Central African Republic that was composed of an
adhoc coalition of African nations. The UN led UN Mission in the Central African
Republic (MINURCA) replaced MISAB in April 1998. MINURCA was a 1,612-person
peace building mission designed to enhance Central African institutions and see the
country through a democratic election process. MINURCA mission stood down in
February of 2000 (United Nations, 2001). Peace lasted for one-year after the conclusion
of the MINURCA operation (Mullenbach, 2018).
The second period of intervention extended from February 2002 to December
2013 and encapsulated three separate peace enforcement operations. Each operation was
led by an African regional entity and was tasked with a nearly identical mission; support
and defend the recognized government against rival militant groups. The first operation
was deployed by the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). The CEN-SAD
mission deployed 300 troops from February until December 2002. CEN-SAD was
augmented by the 380-troop Multinational Force in the Central African Republic
(FOMUC) in October 2002. FOMUC was a CEMAC peace enforcement operation that
remained in place until transition to the larger ECCAS led Mission for the Consolidation
of Peace in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX) in June 2008. MICOPAX was a
2,800-person force that remained in place until December 2013. MICOPAX failed to
stop the Séléka led fall of Bangui in 2011. The second period of intervention failed to
prevent the onset of the Central African War as well as the subsequent defeat of the
recognized government (Meyer, 2009).
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The Central African Republic War ignited a global focus on the Central African
Republic resulting in the deployment of four peace operations led by four different
entities. French Operation Sangaris and the AU’s African-led International Support
Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA) were launched in December 2013.
MISCA’s 6,030 personnel were tasked as a peacekeeping force responsible for stabilizing
the country and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid. The 1,600 French soldiers
of Operation Sangaris were tasked with peace enforcement in support of MISCA.
MISCA was unable to neither stop the violence nor effect the underlying conditions. As
a result, it transitioned to UN Multidimensional Integrated Stability Mission in the
Central African Republic (MINUSCA) in September 2014 (United Nations, 2018).
MINUSCA was an 14,110-person UN led peacebuilding operation tasked with stabilizing
and supporting the transition of the republic to democracy. The EU Military Operation in
the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA) was opened as a peacekeeping operation
supporting MINUSCA via providing local security in Bangui. EUFOR RCA’s 700
troops fulfilled this mission from September 2014 until March 2015 (European Union,
2018). Operation Sangaris was withdrawn in October 2016. The conflict continues at the
less than war level and MINUSCA continues to support stability and the transition to
democracy.
Comoros
Conflicts. The Comoros islands have experienced frequent low-level conflicts for
central control. Both non-democratic transitions of power and election related violence
have perpetuated instability. These incidents have all arisen from inter-island rivalry and
20

power competition. None of these events have risen to the level of war (Mullenbach,
2018).
Peace Operations. Comoros has hosted seven peace operations despite never
reaching conflict at the level of war. Five of the seven operations were monitoring
operations deployed during times of election or disarmament. All seven have been led by
either the AU or its precursor organization, the OAU. The four Observer Mission in the
Comoros (OMIC, OMIC 2, OMIC 3, and OMIC 4) missions and AMISEC were
monitoring missions that occurred in isolation from one another. OMIC consisted of 20
observers, took place from November 1997 to May 1999, and was tasked with building
confidence in the government of Comoros by way of observing actions. OMIC 2 had 14
observers, took place from November 2001 to February 2002, and was responsible for
observing combatant disarmament. OMIC 3 had 34 observers, took place from March to
May 2002, and was responsible for observing election related violence. OMIC 4 had 39
observers, took place from November 2001 to February 2002, and was responsible for
observing election related violence. The March to June 2006 AU Mission to Support
Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC) had an observer mandate for its 522-personnel to
carry out. The Electoral and Security Mission in the Comoros (MAES) and Operation
Democracy in the Comoros were the only partnered missions in the Comoros. MAES’s
482 personnel conducted peacekeeping operations from June 2007 to October 2008.
Operation Democracy in the Comoros’1,350 personnel executed a peace enforcement
mandate in support of MAES from March 2008 to April 2008. The conclusion of MAES
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mission has led to a resilient peace with no further peace operation deployments and no
incidents of war (Mullenbach, 2018).
Chad
Conflicts. Chad has experienced six conflicts reaching the level of war. These
conflicts have nearly all been wars for central control. Belligerent groups have been
frequently supported by and served as proxies of France, Libya, and Sudan. The First
Chadian Rebellion (1966-1971) was fought by the National Liberation Front of Chad
(FROLINAT) against French supported government of Chad. Combat deaths are
estimated four-thousand in total (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). The Second Chadian War
(1980-1984) was fought between the Chadian government, Sudanese/French supported
Armed Forces of the North (FAN), and Libyan supported FROLINAT. The war
produced six-thousand battle related deaths and ended with the FAN consolidation of
power. Next, the Azouzou Strip War (1986-1987) resulted from Libya’s refusal to
withdraw from and attempted annexation of northern Chad following the Second Chadian
War. Chad won a decisive victory. Battle related deaths are estimated at 7,000 Libyans
and 1,000 Chadians (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). Then, the Déby Coup (1989-1990)
pitted a rebel group led by Iriss Déby and supported by both Sudan and Libya against the
Chadian government. The war ended with Déby in power and an estimated 4,000 battle
related deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). Next, the Togoimi Revolt (1998-2000) was
fought between the government of Chad and a coalition of northern rebel groups. The
war ended with a negotiated settlement and resulted in 1,500 battle related deaths
(Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). Finally, the Chad-United Opposition War (2005-2008)
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pitted the government of Chad against a Sudanese supported alliance of rebel groups
from eastern Chad and Darfur. The war ended in a negotiated settlement and caused
3,500 battle related deaths.
Peace Operations. Chad has hosted one stand-alone and one series of two peace
operations dispersed between two conflicts. The UN led monitoring operation, UN
Azouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG), monitored the Libyan withdrawal from
Azouzou Strip between May and June 1994 (United Nations, 2018). The mission was
limited to 15 personnel. Peace lasted four years ending with the outbreak of the Fourth
Chad War (Togoimi Revolt) of 1998-2000.
The second group of operations deployed in response to the Chad-United
Opposition War of 2005-2008. The UN led international intervention with the
peacebuilding UN Mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT)
from September 2007 to December 2010. MINURCAT consisted of 4,903 personnel
tasked with supporting the rule of law and protection of civilians (United Nations, 2018).
MINURCAT was supported from January 2008 to March 2009 by the EU Military
Operation in Chad (EUFOR-Chad). The EUFOR-Chad peacekeeping operation consisted
of 3,700-personnel tasked with securing the areas around and within refugee camps
(European Union, 2018 ). MINURCAT/EUFOR-Chad produced a resilient peace in
Chad’s eastern border regions.
Côte d’Ivoire
Conflicts. Côte d’Ivoire experienced two wars post-independence. Both conflicts
were caused by intergroup tensions between southern Christian and northern Muslim
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groups. The Côte d’Ivoire Military War (2002-2005) pitted various military units against
one another. The conflict ended in a negotiated settlement and caused around 3,000 total
battle related deaths occurred (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). The Second Côte d’Ivoire
War (2011) stemmed from similar circumstances and caused an additional 3,000 battle
related deaths.
Peace Operations. Côte d’Ivoire hosted four peace operations in one series
confronting two wars and stretching from 2002 to 2017. The Côte d’Ivoire Military
War’s beginning was met with the quick deployment of the 5,000-soldier French
Operation Licorne. Operation Licorne initially deployed as a peacekeeping operation,
but occasionally adopted the offensive nature of peace enforcement (French Ministry of
Defense, 2018). The 1,500-person peacekeeping Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI) operation deployed in October
2002 to enforce a ceasefire. The UN deployed the 184-person UN Mission in Côte
d’Ivoire (MINUCI) monitor mission in May 2003 to observe the conflict and assist
ECOMICI. In April 2004, both ECOMICI and MINUCI transitioned into the 6,910person UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI) peacebuilding mission. Peace held in
Côte d’Ivoire from 2005 to 2011 (United Nations, 2018).
ONUCI and Operation Licorne remained in place to support Ivoirian peace, but
failed to hold off the Second Côte d’Ivoire War that resulted from president Gbagbo’s
2011 stolen election. However, their presence did limit the war’s duration to less than
one year. The two missions held in place after the war with Operation Licorne
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withdrawing in 2015 and ONUCI in 2017 (United Nations, 2018). Peace has been
resilient since the withdrawal of ONUCI.
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire)
Conflicts. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or Zaire has
experienced nearly endemic conflict since independence from Belgium in 1960. The
country has hosted six wars and innumerable incidents of organized violence at the less
than war level. The First DRC (Zaire) War (1960–1963) took place in southeastern
province of Katanga between the Zairian government supported by the United Nations
Operation in the Congo (ONUC) and local rebels. The war ended in government victory
and 9,000 battle related deaths. The Jeunesse War (1963 to 1965) was a second war of
succession. A Maoist group calling itself the Jeunesse warriors battled the government
for an independent Kwilu province. The war ended in a government victory and resulted
in 9,000 battle related deaths. The Simba Rebellion or Third DRC War overlapped in
time with the Jeunesse War between 1964 and 1965. The Simbas supported by the
Cuban, Algerian, and Egyptian Governments fought government forces aided by the
Belgian military and the United States Air Force. The war ended in a government victory
and caused over 4,000 battle related deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). Next came a
resumption of the First DRC War. The Shaba War or Fourth DRC War (1978) resulted
in approximately 1,000 battle related deaths; nearly all on the separatist’s side. The Fifth
DRC War (1996 to 1997) resulted in the overthrow of the Mobuto regime by the Alliance
of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL) aided by Rwanda and
Uganda. The war resulted in at least 4,000 battle-related deaths and returned the name of
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the country to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).
Lastly, Africa’s World War (1998-2002) began as a struggle between the government and
multiple rebel groups. Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi supported the rebel groups.
Zimbabwe, Chad, Sudan, Angola, and Namibia supported the government. The war
ended in a negotiated power sharing agreement and caused an incalculable number of
deaths; estimates range from one million to 7.6 million (Associated Press, 2010). Post
conflict violence has been endemic in the DRC but has not reached the status of a further
intra-state war (Mullenbach, 2018).
Peace Operations. The international reaction to Africa’s World War in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo is one of the most complex and robust series of peace
operation interventions. The series began with the 43-person OAU Observer Mission
that was sent to monitor an early cease fire from November 1999 to November 2000.
The 4,278-person UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo-a
(MONUC-a) peacekeeping mission was initiated 14 days after the OAU Observer
Mission. MONUC-a served to separate combatants and to protect civilians. MONUC-a
transitioned to the massive 22,016-person MONUC-b peacebuilding mission in January
2002. MONUC-b added disarmament, reintegration, rule of law development, and
border protection to the mandate. MONUC-b was assisted by the 2,060-soldier
Operation Artemis EU peace enforcement mission from June to September 2003. The
EU Mission to Provide Advice and Assistance for Security Sector Reform in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC-Congo) fifty personnel peacebuilding
operation also supported MONUC-b with security sector reform from January 2005 until
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the present. MONUC-b was also supported by the 2,275-person peacebuilding EU Force
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EURFOR-RD) that performed election support
from April to September 2006. MONUC-b transitioned to the 20,359 UN Organization
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)
peacebuilding mission. MONUSCO added robust peace enforcement tasks and
capabilities to the mission. MONUSCO continues to the present supported by EUSECCongo.
Eritrea and Ethiopia
Conflicts. Eritrea’s battle for independence encompassed four wars. The first
war, the Eritrean Split (1972-1974) was fought between the Eritrean Liberation Front
(ELF) and a splinter group named the Eritrean Popular Liberation Front (ELPF). The
infighting ended as the groups turned their efforts against Ethiopia. The war resulted in
3,000 combat deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). Next, Ethiopian troops supported by
Cuba defeated the ELF and ELPF in the Eritrean War (1975-1978). The war resulted in
over 12,000 battle-related deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). Then, the Tigrean and
Eritrean War (1982-1991) resulted in Eritrean and Tigrean rebel victory over the
Ethiopian government. The Tigrean rebels became the national government of Ethiopia
and the EPLF announced Eritrean independence. The war caused 75,000 battle-related
deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). Finally, the Badme Border War (1988-2000)
emanated from an unresolved border dispute. The war ended in an OAU mediated
agreement and an estimated 120,000 battle related deaths occurred (Sarkees & Wayman,
2010).
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Peace Operations. The UN and AU deployed peacekeeping forces in response to
the inter-state Badme Border War. Both the AU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea
(OMLEE) and UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) deployed from July 2000
to July 2008. UNMEE was a 4,627-person peacekeeping force that deployed to separate
the waring parties in support of a cease fire agreement (United Nations, 2018). OMLEE
was a 43-person monitoring mission deployed to monitor the conflict and provide AU
assistance to the UN (Williams, 2016). Peace was resilient following the withdrawal of
forces.
Guinea
Conflicts. The Guinean War (2000-2001) emanated from a failed coup and the
spillover of regional instability. Government forces battled the Rally of Democratic
Forces of Guinea in country and crossed boarders to fight Liberian national forces. The
war ended in a peace agreement and resulted in slightly more than 1,000 combat deaths.
Peace Operations. The ECOWAS brokered peace agreement did include plans
for the deployment of a peace keeping force, but funding was never secured and the
deployment of ECOMOG (ECOWAS Military Observation Group) Guinea never
occurred (Mullenbach, 2018).
Guinea Bissau
Conflicts. The Guinea-Bissau Military War (1998-1999) was an intra-state war
played out between the government backed by Senegal and Guinea and rebel forces. The
war ended with a rebel victory and resulted in over 2,000 combat related deaths.

28

Residual violence was quelled by the ECOWAS peacekeeping force, ECOWAS Military
Observer Group (ECOMOG-GB) peace operation.
Peace Operations. Guinea-Bissau has seen one peace operation deployed in
response to the Guinea-Bissau Military War (1998-1999) and three deployed during
times of less than war conflict. ECOMOG-GB deployed from December 1998 to June
1999 in response to the Guinea-Bissau Military War. ECOMOG-GB was a 712-person
peacekeeping force sent to ensure the success of the peace agreement (Obi, 2009).
ECOMOG-GB produced a resilient peace with no periods of war and no further peace
operation deployments for nine years. The 24-person peacebuilding EU Security Sector
Reform (EU-SSR) mission deployed February 2008 to enhance the rule of law via
security sector reform. The mission withdrew in September 2010 in response to host
government non-adherence to the rule of law (European Union, 2018). The 250-person
Angolan Military Mission in Guinea-Bissau (MISSANG-GB) peacebuilding mission
deployed from March 2011 to June of 2012 with a similar mandate to that of the EUSSR. MISSANG-GB withdrew after a coup destabilized Guinea-Bissau (Mullenbach,
2018). The 700-person peacekeeping ECOMIB Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB)
operation deployed in May 2012 to provide security through a peace agreement mandated
transition period. ECOMIB would remain in place until June 2017. Peace has been
resilient since the mission closure.
Kenya
Conflicts. Post-World War II Kenya experienced one conflict rising to the level
of war. The extra-state British-Mau Mau War (1952-1956) contested between the “Mau
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Mau” guerilla force and the British military. The war resulted in more than 17,000 battle
related deaths and ended in a British military victory.
Peace Operations. Kenya has not hosted any peace operations.
Liberia
Conflicts. Charles Taylor subjected Liberia to a near perpetual state of conflict
between 1989 and 2003 reaching the level of war three times. The First Liberia War
(1989-1990) began when National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), supported by
Libya’s Qaddafi and incubated in neighboring Côte d’Ivoire, invaded. ECOWAS
deployed the ECOWAS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) as a peace-enforcement
mission to fight the NPFL on behalf of the national government. The conflict ended in a
stalemate and caused 10,000 battle field deaths. War resumed with the Second Liberia
War (1992-1996). The war ended in national elections and an estimated 200,000 to
300,000 deaths. Finally, the Liberia-LURD War (2002-2003) broke between the Taylor
led government and two Guinean supported rebel groups. The Liberians United for
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia
(MODEL) rebel groups won the war. The signing of a peace treaty, the imprisonment of
Charles Taylor, and the election of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf as the first African female head
of state followed the war. An accurate death toll is unknown for this war.
Peace Operations. Liberia has hosted six peace operations in two series spanning
three wars between 1990 and the 2018. The ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG-L)
12,040-person peace enforcement mission was deployed to support the government in
ending the First Liberian war in August 1990 and would stay through the Second
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Liberian War. The UN deployed a 642-person monitoring mission, UN Observer
Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), to observe ceasefire adherence and support ECOMOG-L
from September 1993 to September 1997. ECOMOG-L officially ended in February
1998, but in practice remained in place continuing its mission until October 1999 (Obi,
2009). Peace was resilient for four years after the withdrawal of ECOMOG-L forces.
The second series of international peace operations in Liberia were launched to
combat the Liberia – LURD War. ECOWAS deployed the 3,356-person ECOWAS
Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) peacekeeping mission from August to September 2003.
ECOMIL was supported by the 4,350-person US Joint Task Force (JTF) Liberia peace
enforcement mission from August to September 2003. ECOMIL transitioned
responsibilities to the newly established UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in October of
2003 (Mullenbach, 2018). The UNMIL peacebuilding mission remained in place until
March 2018. It was comprised of 17,045-personnel and focused on maintaining the
peace while developing the host nation security sector (United Nations, 2018). Peace has
been resilient post UNMIL.
Madagascar
Conflicts. The Third Franco-Madagascan War was fought 1947-1948. Malagasy
soldiers returning from WWII service in the French army fought the French military for
control of the island. The French army brutally repressed the uprising. The war resulted
in a French victory and 100,000 battle related deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).
Peace Operations. Madagascar has not hosted any peace operations.
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Mali
Conflicts. Mali’s Tuareg Independence War (2012-2013) was sparked by the
return of Tuareg fighters who had been employed by Libyan president Gadhafi prior to
his fall. The war was fought between Tuareg fighters in the National Movement for the
Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) supported by numerous militant Islamic groups and the
Malian government supported by France, Chad, and Nigeria. The war officially ended in
a government victory and resulted in over 1,000 combat deaths. However, violence
continues at a less than war level.
Peace Operations. Mali’s Tuareg Independence War has sparked a large
international peace operation response. The first deployment was the 3,300-troop joint
ECOWAS-AU African Led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) peace
enforcement operation deployed from December 2012 to April 2013. France deployed
Operation Serval in January 2013 and remained in place until July 2014. Operation
Serval was a 4,000-soldier peace enforcement operation in support of AFISMA and the
UN Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). AFISMA and Serval
together sought to restore Malian government control of the north and prevent the spread
of terrorist activities. AFISMA transitioned to MINUSMA in April 2013. MINUSMA is
a 15,425-person peace building mission that seeks to stabilize the region and develop
Malian institutions. MINUSMA is also supported by the EU Training Mission in Mali
(EUTM Mali) that has performed security sector reform and development peacebuilding
efforts since February 2013. Operation Serval was replaced by Operation Barkhane in
August 2014. Operation Barkhane has an expended mission to provide enforcement
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capabilities against terror groups throughout the Sahel. Peace has not been established in
Mali (World Peace Foundation, 2017).
Mozambique
Conflicts. Conflicts in Mozambique twice reached the level of war. The
Mozambique-Portuguese War (1964-1975) was fought between the Marxist Front for the
Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) backed by the Soviet Union and China and the
Portuguese government. The war ended when a Portuguese coup resulted in the
withdrawal of all troops. The war resulted in Mozambican independence and 14,000
battle related deaths. The Mozambique War (1979-1992) soon followed. The
Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) supported by South Africa fought
FRELIMO supported by Zimbabwe and Tanzania for central control. The war ended in a
political settlement and caused over 20,000 battle related deaths.
Peace Operations. The Mozambique War saw a small peacekeeping mission
transfer to a larger peacebuilding operation and the production of resilient peace. The 30person Joint Verification Mission (JVC) was deployed from December 1990 to October
1992. The JVC maintained safe passage corridors, supported the cease-fire, and enabled
time for the Rome Agreement to be negotiated. The JVC was an adhoc organization with
Kenya, Portugal, US, Zambia, Congo, France, USSR, and UK all contributing troops
(Hume, 1994). The JVC was replaced by the 6,576-pax UN Operation in Mozambique
(ONUMOZ) in December 1992. ONUMOZ was tasked with implementing the Rome
Agreement including election and governance support. ONUMOZ was closed in
December 1994. Peace has been resilient since that time (United Nations, 2001).
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Namibia
Conflicts. Namibia has experienced one war. The South African Border War
(1975-1988) was fought by the South West Africans Peoples’ Organization (SWAPO)
supported by Angola against the South African government. The war ended in a peace
agreement and Namibian independence. The war resulted in 20,000 battle related deaths
(Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).
Peace Operations. The UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was the only
peace operation to support the peace process of the South African Border War.
UNTAG’s 7,993 personnel oversaw elections and assisted in ending systematic
discrimination. The UNTAG peacebuilding operation deployed from April 1989 to
March 1990 and produced a resilient peace (United Nations, 2001).
Nigeria
Conflicts. Post-Independence Nigeria has been plagued by inter-ethnic conflict
that has risen to the level of war on four occasions. The Biafra War (1967-1970) began
when three Igbo majority states declared independence. The Nigerian military won a
slow war of attrition resulting in 45,000 battle-related deaths and the starvation deaths of
one-half million civilians (Mullenbach, 2018). Next, the Nigeria-Muslim War (1980–
1981) was fought between the Nigerian government and Muslim fundamentalist in Kano
province. A rapid Nigerian military victory resulted in slightly over 1,000 battle-related
deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). Next, the extra-state Jukun-Tiv War (1991–1992)
was fought between two ethnic groups in eastern Nigeria. The deployment of national
forces ended the fighting that had caused more than 1,000 battle related deaths (Sarkees
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& Wayman, 2010). Finally, the Boko Haram War began with one-sided violence in
2009, progressed to the level of war in 2012, and is currently ongoing. The war is fought
by the joint effort of the governments of Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, and Chad against the
Boko Haram militant group. The total number of battle-related deaths is difficult to
ascertain but believed to be well over 20,000 (Matfess, 2017).
Peace Operations. See the Regional Peace Interventions section below for a
description of the counter-Boko Haram Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) peace
enforcement mission.
Rwanda
Conflicts. Rwanda has reached the level of war five times. Each time has been
the result of ethnic tensions between the elite Tutsi minority and the Hutu majority. The
Rwandan Social Revolution (1959-1962) began pre-independence as a Hutu reaction to
future Tutsi rule. The war ended with the Tutsi king being deposed and 20,000 battle
related deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). Next, the First Rwanda War (1963-1964)
occurred when exiled Tutsi’s attempted a return to power. The war ended with a Hutu
military victory and 1,000 battle related deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). The Second
Rwanda War (1994) and the associated genocide was fought between the Tutsi Rwanda
Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Hutu government. The war ended with an RPF military
victory and an end to the genocide. However, more than a million people were killed in
the conflict and related genocide (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). Then the
Third Rwanda War (1997-1998) and Fourth Rwandan War (2001) each began with a
Hutu offensive launched from the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the intention
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of regaining central control of Rwanda. In each war the attack was repulsed, and the
government remained in control. The Third and Fourth Rwandan Wars combined
produced approximately 5,000 battle related deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).
Peace Operations. Rwanda played host to seven peace operations in the time
directly before and after the 1994 genocide. The first three missions were all OAU led
observer mission employed to monitor cease fire agreements. The OAU Military
Observer Team (OAU MOT) deployed 15 personnel from April to September 1991. The
mission was replaced by the 40-person OAU Neutral Military Observer Group (OAU
NMOG) that served from September 1991 to July 1992. OAU NMOG I sought to
improve on the OAU MOT model by employing personnel from non-interested nations.
OAU NMOG II replaced OAU NMOG I. It deployed from August 1992 until November
1993. OAU NMOG II increased the troop strength to 132 personnel in an attempt to
better document the violence (Berman & Sams, 2000). The UN Observer Mission
Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) deployed to southern Uganda in response to OAU NMOG
II reporting of armed groups operating on the Uganda-Rwanda border in June 1993.
UNOMUR’s 81 personnel were tasked with monitoring the activities of armed groups on
the border (United Nations, 2001).
The growing tension as reported by OAU NMOG II and UNOMUR led to the
creation of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR I) in October 1993.
UNAMIR I was a 444-person peacekeeping mission that sought to ensure
implementation of the peace agreement and protect civilians. It failed at both as the
Rwanda genocide and the Second Rwanda War began under its mandate. In May 1994
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UNAMIR I transitioned to UNAMIR II with an increase to 5,737 total personnel and a
more robust mandate to protect civilians, support reconciliation, and train security forces
(United Nations, 2001). UNOMUR was withdrawn in September 1994 as it was no
longer relevant to monitor the border with Uganda. The French peace enforcing
Operation Turquoise was deployed from June to July 1994 to provide a humanitarian
safety zone in Rwanda’s west (United Nations, 2001). Peace failed to be resilient as the
Third Rwanda War began one year after UNAMIR II’s withdrawal in March 1996.
Sierra Leone
Conflicts. The First and Second Sierra Leone Wars together compose a decade of
intrastate conflict between 1991 and 2000 with a pause in the fighting from 1997-1999.
The First Sierra Leone War (1991-1996) was fought between the Revolutionary United
front (RUF) supported by Liberia and the government of Sierra Leone assisted by South
African mercenaries. The war ended in a peace agreement and caused an estimated
25,000 conflict deaths occurred in the war (Mullenbach, 2018). Next, the Second Sierra
Leone War (1998-2000) was started by an alliance of anti-RUF local security forces,
ECOMOG forces, and the British Sandline mercenary group with the intention of
wresting power from the RUF. The RUF received support from Burkina Faso and
Liberia in their ensuing “Operation No Living Thing” scorched earth campaign. The war
ended with another peace agreement. Total battle related deaths are unknown for this
conflict, but estimates are over 100,000 for the 1991-2000 decade of fighting.
Peace Operations. Sierra Leone hosted five peace operations in response to the
First and Second Sierra Leone Wars. The 9,000-person ECOWAS Military Observer
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Group-Sierra Leone (ECOMOG-SL) peace enforcement mission deployed from June
1997 to May 2000. ECOMOG-SL was able to force an end to the First Seirra Leone War
but failed to prevent the onset of the Second Sierra Leone War (Mullenbach, 2018). The
217-person UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) monitoring mission was
deployed July 1998 to October 1999. UNOMSIL partnered with ECOMOG-SL
providing assistance in monitoring a cease-fire agreement. UNOMSIL transitioned to the
18,329-person UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) peacebuilding mission in
October 1999. UNAMSIL remained in place until December 2005. UNAMSIL was
tasked with providing security, building institutions, and overseeing elections in to build
a positive peace (United Nations, 2009). Two UK Missions assisted UNAMSIL. The
1,300-person peace enforcement mission, Operation Palliser, deployed May to June 2000
with a mandate to defeat the RUF. Operation Palliser transitioned to Operation Basilica
and Silkman, a 250-personnel peacebuilding operation supporting security force
development, in June 2000. Operation Basilica and Silkman and UNAMSIL both closed
in 2005 leaving behind a resilient peace (Ucko, 2016).
Somalia and Ogaden
Conflicts. Somalia has experience five post-World War II wars. The first two
wars, the First (1963-1964) and Second (1976-1980) Ogaden Wars began as inter-state
conflict with Ethiopia. In the First Ogaden War the Somali government supported the
Western Somali Liberation Front’s (WSLF) successionist campaign against the Ethiopian
government that was supported by Cuban and Soviet forces. The Ogaden wars ended
with an Ethiopian battle field victory and estimated 60,000 battle field deaths (Sarkees &
38

Wayman, 2010). The First (1988-1991), Second (1991-1997), and Third (2006-2012)
Somali Wars all emerged from the state collapse caused by the Somali defeat in the
Ogaden wars. The Somali central government was defeated by a coalition of the Somali
National Movement (SNM), Somali National Alliance (SNA), the Somali Salvation
Alliance (SSA), and the United Somali Congress (USC) in the First Somalia War. The
war resulted in 5,000 battle related deaths. The Second Somalia War grew from the
disintegration of the coalition force that had won the First Somali War. The war ended
with a peace agreement. Estimates of battlefield deaths vary from 32,000 to 100,000
(Mullenbach, 2018). Finally, the Third Somalia War was contested between the
internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and various Islamic
groups led by Al Shabab and the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts. The TFG was
supported by AU peace enforcement mission AMISOM (AU Mission in Somalia); as
well as the militaries of Kenya, Ethiopia, the United States, and France. The war ended
with a TFG military victory. Total battle related deaths estimates vary between three and
twelve thousand.
Peace Operations. Five Peace operations have been deployed in response to the
Second (1991-1997) and Third (2006-20012) Somali Wars. The 947-person
peacekeeping UN Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) deployed in April 1992 to
monitor a cease fire agreement and permit the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The
37,000-person Unified Task Force (also known as Operation Restore Hope) peace
enforcement operation was deployed to bolster UNOSOM I efforts in December 1992.
The Unified Task Force was a US led coalition of 27 nations. UNOSOM I and the
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Unified Task Force merged into the UN led UNOSOM II peace building operation in
March 1993 (United Nations, 2001). UNOSOM II was a 30,800-person peacebuilding
operation with responsibility to permit humanitarian assistance, provide security, and
oversee demobilization efforts. UNOSOM II was closed in March 1995 due to
international frustration at the pace of change and the continuation of the conflict (United
Nations, 2003).
The Third Somali War erupted in 2006. The AU took the lead in response with
the formation of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). AMISOM is a 22,126-person
peace enforcement mission tasked with establishing the peace and setting the conditions
necessary for handover to Somali authorities. AMISOM has been deployed since January
2007 (African Union, 2018). The EU Training Mission (EUTM Somalia) is a 193-person
peace building operation that leads security sector reform and training initiatives in
support of AMISOM. The EUTM Somalia has been deployed since April 2010
(European Union, 2018). Both missions remain deployed and the conflict continues at a
less than war level.
South Africa
Conflicts. South Africa’s anti-apartheid violence began almost immediately
following independence in 1961 and continued until the election of Nelson Mandela to
president in 1994. However, only once did the violence reach the level of war. The
Inkatha-ANC War (1987-1994) pitted the apartheid government supported Inkatha
political group against the Soviet and Angolan supported African National Congress
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(ANC). The war caused 20,000 battle related deaths and ended on the election of Nelson
Mandela, an ANC leader, to president in 1994 (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).
Peace Operations. One peace operation complimented with numerous civil
assistance and monitoring missions was deployed to ease the end of apartheid minority
rule in South Africa. The Commonwealth Peacekeeping Assistance Group South Africa
(CPAG-SA) was a 33-person peace building operation that deployed from February to
April 1994. CPAG-SA performed security sector reform in support of the formation of
the newly integrated South African Defense Forces (Canadian Defense Forces, 2017).
CPAG-SA was complimented by the UN Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA),
the European Community Observer Mission in South Africa (ECOMSA), and the OAU
Observer Mission in South Africa (OAUOMSA) civil missions that observed the
transition of power and conduct of elections from September 1992 to June 1994 (United
Nations, 2007). South Africa has not returned to intra-state war following the
redeployment of the operation.
South Sudan
Conflicts. South Sudan has been locked into near perpetual conflict over who
should govern the region. The First (1963-1972) and Second (1983-2005) South Sudan
Wars were wars of succession fought by the Christian south against the Muslim
dominated government in Khartoum. The SPLA Division War (1991-1992) and the
South Sudanese Civil War (2012-2015) were conflicts between southern leaders and
ethnic groups. The First South Sudan War was between the southern Anya-Nya group
supported by Israel and the northern government supported by Egypt, the Soviet Union,
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and other Socialist powers. The war ended in a peace agreement and left an estimated
one-half million dead. The Second South Sudan War was fought along similar lines. The
southern Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) rebelled in response to the north’s
attempted imposition of Islamic Sharia law on the Christian south. The Sudanese
government was aided by Libya, Iran, and Eritrea. The southern cause was aided by
Tanzania, Uganda, and Israel. Ethiopia alternated between providing support to the
government and the rebels. The Second South Sudan War ended in an agreement that led
to South Sudanese independence and caused 100,000 battle-related deaths. The
intracommunal SPLA Division War was fought between southern splinter groups. The
war ended when splinter groups refocused their efforts against the north and caused 1,200
battle related deaths. Finally, the South Sudan Civil War fought between southern
leaders who relied extensively on ethnic loyalties to drive their supporters to take up arms
against one-another. The Ugandan military and the Darfurian Justice and Equality
Movement militia intervened on behalf of the government. The war has been resilient
through many agreements and continues at a less than war level. The war has resulted in
50,000 combat related deaths as of 2015 (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).
Peace Operations. Four peace operations have deployed to South Sudan. The
25-person, UN led, Joint Military Commission and International Monitoring Unit (JMC
and IMU) monitoring mission was deployed from April 2002 to June 2005 to monitor the
SPLA withdrawal from the Nuba Mountains (Mullenbach, 2018). The 14,799-person
peacebuilding UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) deployed in March 2005 following the
signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (United Nations, 2011). UNMIS
42

was tasked with assisting in demobilization, leading security sector reform, providing
rule of law support, and conducting elections assistance. UNMIS was replaced in the
18,013-person UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) peacebuilding operation in June
2011 following the declaration of South Sudanese independence. UNMISS added peace
enforcement protection of civilians language to the previous mandate (United Nations,
2018). The 4,803-person UN Interim Security Force for Abyei Area (UNISFA)
peacekeeping mission was also started in June 2011. UNISFA is responsible for
preventing a return to conflict between the governments of Sudan and South Sudan in the
disputed Abyei area (United Nations, 2018). Both UNMISS and UNISFA continue to the
present and struggle to contain the high levels of violence that remain endemic to South
Sudan.
Sudan (Darfur)
Conflicts. Pastoral agrarian and ethnic tensions have reached the level of war in
Darfur one-time. The Darfur War (2003-2006) was fought between Black agrarian tribes
and Arab nomadic herders. The black tribes were represented by the Sudan Liberation
Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM); each of which sought
Darfurian autonomy and received support from Chad. The Arab tribes were represented
by pro-government Janjaweed militias supported by the Sudanese government. The
conflict was reduced to a less than war level following the signing of a peace agreement.
At least 2.5 million people were displaced and between 200,000 and 400,000 died
(Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).
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Peace Operations. Four peace operations have deployed in response to Sudan’s
Darfur Rebellion. The 390-person AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS 1) monitoring operation
deployed from April to October 2004 to observe and report on the conflict. AMIS 1 was
replaced by the 7,641-person peacekeeping AMIS 2 operation in October 2004. AMIS
2’s mandate included responsibility to prevent resumption of hostilities by providing a
buffer between warring groups. The EU Support Mission to AMIS 2 was a 150-person
peacekeeping mission deployed July 2005 to December 2007 to assist AMIS 2 in its
peacekeeping responsibilities (European Union, 2018). AMIS 2 was replaced by a joint
UN/AU mission in July 2007. The UN and AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) is a
23,448 person peacebuilding mission tasked with preventing a return to conflict,
facilitating intercommunal dialogue, and the protection of civilians (United Nations,
2018). UNAMID remains in place to the present and the conflict remains at a less than
war level.
Uganda
Conflicts. Four wars have contested the question of who should lead Uganda.
The First Uganda War (1966) occurred when the Baganda tribe attempted to depose
Prime Minister Obote. The war ended with a government victory and 1,000 battle related
deaths. Next, the Ugandan-Tanzanian War (1978–1979) was fought between the
Ugandan government supported by Libya and the Uganda National Liberation Army
(UNLA) supported by Tanzania. The war ended in a rebel victory and resulted in 3,000
battle related deaths; civilian casualties were estimated at 500,000. Next, the Second
Uganda War (1980-1986) was contested between the ruling UNLA and Yoweri
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Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA). The war ended in a rebel victory. Total
battle deaths are estimated at 46,000 and civilian deaths are estimated to be 800,000.
Finally, the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) attempted to seize power in the Holy Spirit
Movement War (1986-1987). The HSM was defeated in a pitched battle in 1987. The
war caused 7,000 battle related deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).
Peace Operations. UNOMUR was the only peace operation based in Uganda.
However, its mission was wholly focused on the conflict in Rwanda. UNOMUR’s 81
personnel deployed to Uganda’s southern border and monitored the activities of armed
groups on the border from June 1993 to September 1994 (United Nations, 2001).
Western Sahara
Conflicts. Western Sahara has experienced one war. The Western Sahara War
(1975-1983) was fought between the Polisario Front supported by Algeria against
Morocco in one sector and against Mauritania in another. The war ended in a UN
brokered ceasefire and resulted in 16,000 battle related deaths (Sarkees & Wayman,
2010).
Peace Operations. Two missions have been deployed in response to the Western
Sahara War. The 90-person OAU Mission to Western Sahara monitoring mission
deployed from January to April 1991 to conduct fact finding operations (Williams, 2016).
The 10,177-person UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)
peacekeeping mission replaced the OAU mission in April 1991. MINURSO added
cease-fire observance to the mandate and remains in place to the present (United Nations,
2018). The conflict remains frozen without casualties, but without resolution.
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Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)
Conflicts. The Rhodesia War (1972-1979) fought by various Black resistance
movements against Rhodesian White minority rule was Zimbabwe’s only war. The
Soviet supported Zimbabwean African People’s Union (ZAPU) and Chinese supported
Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) battled the South African and
Mozambican backed government. The war took place over seven years of harsh guerrilla
fighting. The war ended in a negotiated settlement followed by the former rebel Robert
Mugabe’s electoral victory. The war caused 11,000 battle-related deaths.
Peace Operations. Zimbabwe has not hosted any peace operations.
Regional Peace Interventions
Two recent peace enforcement operations take a regional approach. The MultiNational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) is a conglomeration of the efforts of Nigeria, Chad,
Cameroon, Niger, and Benin to confront the Boko Haram terrorist group. The MNJTF is
authorized by an AU mandate and seeks to coordinate efforts to restore peace in the
region. It formed in October 2014 and has approximately 10,000 troops assigned to it
(Assanvo, Ella, Abatan, & Sawadogo, 2016). The French Operation Barkhane is another
a regional peace enforcement operation. Operation Barkhane’s 3,000 troops began
operations in August 2014. Barkhane supports MINUSMA in Mali and national
governments throughout the Sahel with counter terror focused enforcement capabilities
(French Ministry of Defense , 2018). Both these operations, and the conflicts they seek
to ameliorate, continue to the present time.
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Conflict Patterns Across African States
African conflicts have proven resilient and African peace fragile. Many countries
have found themselves in the throes of four or five sequential wars all drawn from the
same conflict conditions. Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Chad, Somalia, Uganda, and others have had four, five, or even six wars generated from
the same basic conditions. Outside interventions have been both a positive and a
negative force. On the negative side, some interventions have directly contributed to
violence and others have been ineffectual at halting it. Regional actors joining Africa’s
World War grew the conflict creating the deadliest conflict since World War II.
UNAMIR I’s presence served mainly to observe and document an ongoing genocide.
However, other interventions have halted violence and stabilized fractured societies.
UNTAG is frequently credited with transforming Namibia from a conflict torn society
into a stable middle-income country.
The reasons for conflict and war in African states changed little over time. Most
conflicts related to identity issues (ethnic, religious, tribal affiliations) and the quest for
power over who would be the dominant actor in these nascent national governments.
These conflicts escalated due to the fragility of post-colonial institutions that were not
adequately developed in the pre-independence period (Williams, 2016).
The pattern of outside interventions in African conflicts, has however, changed
significantly. Before 1990, individual states seeking to pursue national interest engaged
in Africa’s wars. The United States, the Soviet Union, China, Cuba and others engaged
in proxy fights perceived to be the front lines between the communist and capitalist
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worlds. The only notable peace operation during this time was ONUC in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, designed to stabilize Katanga province. Since 1990, peace
operation interventions increased exponentially in Africa: over 80 operations were
organized through 2015.
The end of the Cold War presented two changes: first, regimes that relied on
superpower support destabilized as they no longer received military and financial
assistance from the U.S. or the USSR, or their funding was significantly reduced; and
second, the original purpose of the UN Security Council to keep peace in the world was
restored as superpower rivalry exercised through the gridlock of veto power dissolved.
The deployment of police and/or military forces to support international peace
and security grew exponentially in post-Cold War Sub-Saharan Africa. In 1989 and 1990
two operations per year were initiated. In 1991 the number was five and in 1992 seven
new operations were initiated. The quantity of interventions has ebbed and flowed from
that time to the present. However, the international community has remained constant in
its support for the presence of interventions to support national and regional issues in
Africa (Williams, 2016).
Peace operations deployed to 23 sub-Saharan African countries have been led by
the UN, the Organization for African Unity/African Union, the European Union, regional
economic communities, ad hoc coalitions and individual countries2. Their tasks have
2

Two recent peace enforcement operations take a regional approach. The Multi-National Joint Task Force
(MNJTF) is a conglomeration of the efforts of Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Benin to confront the
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supports MINUSMA in Mali and national governments throughout the Sahel with counter terror focused
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been designed to assist in the prevention or cessation of armed conflict by serving to
observe or assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements; enforcement of
ceasefires or peace agreements; or to build a stable peace (Williams, 2013).

enforcement capabilities (French Ministry of Defense , 2018). Both these operations, and the conflicts they
seek to ameliorate, continue to the present time.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY
This study examined all sub-Saharan peace operations that occurred from 1990
through 2015. There were 86 missions spread across 23 African states. The main
question addressed is: Did the intervention force achieve a desired peaceful outcome and
was that peace, if established, resilient? These operations were led by a multitude of
organizations covering a variety of mission objectives. It is assumed that the nature of a
conflict dictates the design and mandate for any peace operation, that in turn, determines
the required force capabilities deemed necessary for implementation. Mission success
requires the appropriate match of intervenor capability to deal with the conflict situation.
The chain leading to failure develops when a mandate does not address the conflict issues
or the force capacity is inadequate to meet mandate requirements.
Hypotheses
To test the linkage between conflict characteristics, mandate features, and
intervenor capacity, the following nine hypotheses were tested:
1. The conflict characteristics determine the peace operation mandate.
2. Peace operations mandate determines the force capacity.
3. The force capacity determines peace operations outcome.
4. The intervening organization is a predictor of peace operations outcomes.
5. Robust mandates produce higher peace operation success rates.
6. Sequential operations lead to greater peace operation success rates.
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7. Force capacity with parallel support missions leads to greater peace operations
success.
8. Force capacity with Western power assistance programs will lead to greater
peace operation success rates.
9. Force capacity that includes both a parallel supporting mission and a Western
Power assistance program will produce the greatest rates of peace operations
success.
Key Variables
The independent variables fall in three broad categories; conflict characteristics,
mandate features, and force composition/capacity. The variables that compose the three
categories are detailed below along with their indicators and coding.
Conflict Characteristics. Peace operations must deal with the conditions of the
conflict into which they are deployed. Some of these conditions or characteristics inhibit
the success of peace operations. Other conditions may make success more likely or have
no discernable effect. Studies by Fortna (2004, 2008); Doyle and Sambanis (2006);
Fiedler (2000); Diehl and Balas (2014); and Walter (2010) have examined the effects of
conflict characteristics. Each study has explored characteristics that make a conflict
resilient to peace and reduce the likelihood of intervention success. Variables discussed
below are categorized into belligerent characteristics, conflict issues, and level/duration
of violence. The analysis of complexity allows the author to compensate for the fact that
missions are not randomly assigned in analysis of the interrelationship between conflict
and mandate (Sambanis, 2008).
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The greater the number of belligerent groups the greater the number of potential
spoilers to any peace deal (Diehl & Druckman, 2015). Multiple groups provide the
opportunity for an equal number of objections to any peace agreement and create great
difficulty in the complexity of interpositional separation and DDR operations. Doyle &
Sambanis (2006) and Fortna (2004) each found a direct correlation between the number
of belligerent groups and the likelihood of violence resurgence.
The presence of external support to both the government and the opposition by
regional powers has been shown to have a corrosive impact on peace interventions.
Arms, materiel, or direct troop intervention are considered to be direct support to a
belligerent party. Support to the government produces a reluctance of the government to
make peace prior to a full battlefield victory. Support to the opposition enables rebel
forces to remain in the field extending conflicts that may have otherwise lessened or
concluded. External support to either party was negative, but support to rebels had the
greater effect on increasing the duration of conflict (Diehl & Balas, 2014).
Wealthy nations were found to recover better from and have lower rates of relapse
from intra-state wars. Potential combatants in wealthy nations had better alternative
opportunities for gain (Diehl & Balas, 2014). These opportunities created drivers away
from conflict. Essentially, a lack of wealth increased the likelihood of recidivism (Doyle
& Sambanis, 2006).
Characteristics found in the conflict issues, those reasons why groups fight, also
impact the challenge of intervention. Categories such as resource conflicts; ethnic or
religious conflicts; separatist conflicts; and/or intra-state conflicts have all been found to
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impact the challenge of intervention. Previous studies have found each of these
categories to have a direct impact on the likelihood that intervention will produce
resilient peace.
Resource conflicts are those that either the primary motivation or sustainment of a
belligerent group was raw resources. The Liberia and Sierra Leone Civil Wars were
seminal examples of resource conflicts. Each conflict centered on control of and was
funded by diamonds. Conflicts fueled by lootable resources resist agreement and are
more likely to experience recidivism (Walter, 2010). Both Fortna (2008) and Sambanis
(2008) found this variable to have the greatest impact of any measured independent
variable on the likelihood a return to violence.
Conflicts with an identity, ethnic or religious, element increase the difficulty of
response. Forces divided along these identity lines find it easier to mobilize support and
are more resilient once fighting has begun (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006). Ethnicity was the
mobilization tool utilized in the Rwanda genocide. Similarly, identity has been employed
as a mobilization tool by rebel groups in South Sudan who are unable to pay or use other
means of coercion towards collective violence. Religious identities have been used to
mobilize in a similar manner (Williams, 2016). Fortna (2008), Sambanis (2008), and
Walter each found identity issues second only to resource issues regarding degree of
impact on the resiliency of a post-civil war peace. Identity has been especially pernicious
conflict characteristic due to its ability to mobilize on behalf of groups otherwise lacking
means.
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Intrastate conflicts are more likely to return to war than interstate conflicts
(Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). This is true for wars for central control, regional internal
wars, and intercommunal wars. Wars for central control are civil wars in which two or
more belligerents compete for sovereignty over the territory of a state. Belligerents may
have the support of outside entities but remain primarily composed of those from that
state such as in the 1992-1994 Angolan War of the Cities (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).
The second intrastate war sub-group is regional internal war. These wars are those in are
contested between regional states, but in the geographic confines of one state. Africa’s
World War, 1998-2002, is one such conflict. All conflict took place within the borders of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo despite there being over a dozen state and nonstate actors participating in the conflict (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). Intercommunal
conflicts are the final type of intrastate war. These conflicts take place within one state
and are contested by non-state actors. These have rarely received international
intervention. The First (1991-1992) and Second (2004) Nigerian Christian-Muslim Wars
are two such conflicts (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). These forms of intrastate wars create
challenges to successful intervention due to the frequency that belligerent groups split
and regroup as well as the durability of identity issues as a grievance.
Peace interventions into separatist conflicts have a greater likelihood of success
than other types of intrastate-war. Separatist conflicts are those in which a rebel group
holds the intention to form a new state as key to their platform. They are in effect a
conflict over the right exercise sovereignty over a specific geographic section of an
existing state and differ from other intrastate conflicts in which two or more groups
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compete for the right to govern the existing territorial boundaries of a state in its entirety.
Most post-independence African separatist conflicts have been at their heart conflicts to
reform the state. Elites from marginalized groups have launched conflicts to gain access
to patrimonial networks that have been denied to them (Williams, 2016). Elites in these
conflicts are generally more prone to negotiate peace and that peace is more likely to hold
than in other intra-state conflict types. Separatist are on whole slightly less likely to
experience recidivism as compared to non-separatist conflicts (Fortna, 2008).
Inter-state wars present a simpler problem set to an intervenor. Inter-state wars
generally present an agreed on boundary on which to interposition forces to prevent a
resumption of violence. Inter-state wars also, generally are dyadic in nature and
composed of groups able to make and keep commitments to treaties and agreements
(Diehl & Balas, 2014). Intra-state wars are chaotic and multifaceted compared to interstate. Inter-state wars make up only three of the conflicts in my study but have a 100%
complete success rate compared with a rate near 50% for all relevant intra-state conflicts.
The duration and intensity of violence also impacts the likelihood of intervention
success. Deaths per annum and duration of violence each correlate toward an increased
likelihood for renewed violence and lower chances for peace operation success (Fortna,
2008). These “enduring rivalries” create heightened and hardened feelings of enmity
between groups. This in turn produces climates in which compromise with former
enemies is politically unpalatable (Diehl & Balas, 2014).
Phase of conflict at intervention has a statistical impact on the challenge of
intervention (Diehl & Balas, 2014; Jett, 1999). Pre-violence conflict prevention is
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theoretically well suited to intervention but currently lacks a significant number of
examples for generalization. Active-violence is the most complex and ill-suited to
traditional peace keeping operations. Active-violence requires troops to be well armed,
well trained, and provided with a robust mandate to carry out the required action
(Boulden, 2001). Post-agreement interventions present the best opportunity for success
and face the fewest obstacles. Post-peace agreement is less complex than post-cease fire
based on historical outcomes (Diehl P. F., 1994). The final category, post-agreement
with residual violence, presents the issues of capacity endemic to the active violence
phase, but with a greater likelihood of combat abatement. This increased probability of
success is resultant from the belligerents demonstrated ability to make an agreement as
well as the existence of a previous agreement to utilize as a starting point of future
negotiations.
The consent of all belligerent forces for the intervention greatly enhance the
probability of intervention success (Diehl & Balas, 2014; Fortna, 2008; Fiedler, 2000).
Major studies to have been unanimous in agreeing that consent has a demonstrable
positive impact on the likelihood of intervention success. The resistance of even one
group can open the intervening force to sabotage and/or make them the target of attack.
1993’s Black Hawk Down incident, that resulted in the withdrawal of UNITAF forces,
was endemic of this effect. I captured consent by measuring the presence of a cease fire
or peace agreement. Post-peace agreement peace operation deployments are predicated
on the consent of the belligerents. The presence of post-agreement continued violence
was indicative of the lack of a credible commitment to peace. The Second South Sudan
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War, 1983-2005, and the South Sudanese Civil War, 2013-Present, are classic example of
this phenomenon where the opposing sides use agreements as strategic moves rather than
genuine efforts towards conflict resolution (Kalpakian, 2017).
Variables that have been found to have no discernable effect on the probability of
success are not utilized in this study. Type of government and geographic size of mission
responsibility have been omitted due to an agreement among previous studies on their
lack of impact on outcomes. Walter (2010) and Sambanis (2008) each found type of
government to have no statistical impact; while Fortuna (2004) and Sambanis (2008)
found geographical size and features to have little or no effect on outcomes. Table 3.1
summarizes the set of conflict characteristics indicators, measurement and sources.
Conflict complexity was a qualitative assessment of the level of challenge a
conflict presents to a theoretical peace operation. The measure was based on the
summation of the independent variables discussed above. Those conflicts that have a
preponderance of the complicating factors were said to be highly complex. Africa’s
World War is the archetype for a highly complex conflict. The war has a long duration of
conflict, numerous belligerent groups, identity issues, external support to belligerents,
readily exploitable resources, no agreed on peace plan, lacks the consent of the
belligerents, has a low capacity for state building, and other numerous factors
complicating any peace intervention. A medium complexity conflict has some, but not
most or all of these factors. For example, the Angolan War of the Cities had
complicating factors such as large numbers of organized armed individuals, highly
exploitable resources, and a long pre-intervention duration of violence. However, the
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war had some advantages such as a higher than average GDP, only two active belligerent
groups, and limited external support to either group. A low complexity conflict may have
some complicating factors, but does not have a majority of issues associated with
resistance to intervention. For example, the War of the Azouzou Strip did have high
casualty numbers and was a resource-based conflict. However, the conflict had a peace
agreement in place, was interstate, and had been fought for a short duration. These three
gradients of complexity are necessary to facilitate the comparison of various peace
operations acknowledging that they are not deployed in a vacuum (Diehl & Balas, 2014).
A summary of conflict characteristics including variables and indicators is displayed in
Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1. Conflict Characteristics
Variable

Indicator Measures

Belligerents







Government vs. 1 opposition? Yes/No
Number of opposing sides: (2, 3, or >3)
Size of forces of each side
External support to government? Yes/No Who? What?
External support to opposition? Yes/No Who? What?

Issues






Intrastate Conflict? Yes/No
Resource Distribution? Yes/No
Ethnic/Religious Discrimination? Yes/No
Separatist Movement? Yes/No

Violence Level

Annual deaths due to political violence

Elapsed time to intervention

Number of months from violence onset until intervention

Conflict Phase at Intervention






Local Capacity

Per-Capita GDP measured via Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)

Pre-Violence
Active Violence (No Agreement)
Post-Cease Fire
Post-Peace Agreement

Sources: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2018); Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees
(2016); Mullenbach (2018); International Peace Institute (2018); World Bank
(2018).

Mandates. Mandates are instructions provided from the lead organization or
country convening the peace operation. The mandate instructions or tasks dictate the
mission’s responsibilities and authorizations. Operations can be classified based on the
contents of these instruction and fall into four basic categories; peace monitoring
missions, traditional peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or peacebuilding (Sandler, 2017).
The 86 missions meeting the criteria of this study have each been categorized into one of
these four categories based on a careful reading of their individual operational guidelines
and deployed areas of effort.
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Peace monitoring, sometimes also referred to as observation, missions are the
least complex of all peace operations. Monitoring missions are small deployments of
observers deployed to perform fact-finding observation of specific actions and report
findings to the lead organization (Fortna, 2003). Monitoring missions may be deployed
prior to violence (OMIC 3 and MIOC), during active conflict (OMIB), or post
ceasefire/peace agreement (UNAVEM I). These missions may act as stand-alone
operations or may be deployed to gather information to be used in the construction of a
more robust operation to be deployed when the situation is viewed as appropriate (Balas,
2011).
Traditional peacekeeping, also referred to as interpositional missions and here
referred to only as peacekeeping, deploy in support of a cease fire with the intent to
promote an environment suitable for conflict resolution. Peacekeeping missions establish
an interpositional buffer between combatants following a ceasefire. The presence of this
buffer seeks to prevent conflict recidivism and enable the conditions necessary for a
permanent peace agreement to be reached. Peacekeeping mission mandates are designed
around the ‘holy-trinity’ of host-nation consent, impartiality, and the minimum use of
force (Bellamy, Williams, & Griffin, 2010). Peacekeeping missions are facilitative and
as such do not directly engage in diplomatic initiatives (Diehl & Balas, 2014). These
missions may work in concert with other missions or as standalone interventions.
Peace enforcements missions seek to end hostilities between warring sides with
active military force. Enforcement missions require a larger military capacity than peace
monitoring or peacekeeping mission types. Enforcement operations conduct offensive
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military operations to force the conditions for peace through punishment of those
responsible for hostilities. The missions may or may not have the consent of the hostnation and/or belligerents. Peace enforcement missions often work in parallel to or as a
precursor to other missions that seek to build a positive peace (Diehl & Balas, 2014).
Peacebuilding operations are the most complex of peace operation mandates.
Peacebuilding operations seek the creation of a new environment; not the mere cessation
of hostilities. Peacebuilding operations are frequently tasked with disarming warring
parties, destroying weapons, conducting security sector reform, facilitating elections,
strengthening government institutions, and numerous other activities (Diehl & Balas,
2014). Peacebuilding missions may be standalone missions tasked with peacekeeping
responsibilities in addition to their transformative tasks (ONUB), parallel missions that
support an existing peacekeeping operation with specific tasks (Operation Basilica and
Silkman), or be a multi-dimensional stabilization mission with a robust combination of
peace enforcement and peace building responsibilities (MINUSMA, MONUSCO).
Peacebuilding missions require the greatest international commitment in terms of troop
numbers and financial investment (Sandler, 2017).
Robust peacekeeping or robust mandates are terms used to describe peace
enforcement and peacebuilding operations that employ force to deter attempts to disrupt
the political process, protect civilians, and/or assist in maintaining law and order. These
mandates frequently include language authorizing the use of all necessary means to
defend the mandate. The offensive use of force differentiates robust from traditional
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operations (United Nations, 2018; Sandler, 2017). Traditional peacekeeping allowed for
use of force only in defense of the peacekeeping force itself (Diehl & Balas, 2014).
Robust mandates were a necessary evolution of peace operations due to the
conflict environments that forces were deployed post-Cold War. Cold War traditional
peacekeeping operations operated under the holy trinity of host nation consent,
impartiality, and minimum use of force. Cold War missions were deployed to relatively
stable post ceasefire or peace agreement situations. In contrast, post-Cold War missions
have been frequently deployed to fractured civil wars. In these situations, there is often
no peace to keep. There may either be no cease-fire/peace agreement or there are spoiler
parties not beholden agreement.
Robust mandates have added coercive force to more appropriately address these
complex environments. The missions are considerably larger than traditional missions
and employ more offensive capability. Robust operations are by design offensively
capable with increased weaponry, forces frequently larger than 20,000 troops, and rules
of engagement permitting offensive action (Williams, 2013).
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 detail mandate types and characteristics. Table 3.2 lists the
four mandate categories with their definition. These definitions were the criteria used in
categorization of individual operations in this study. Table 3.3 provides more detailed
information on characteristics common to each type of mandate.
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Table 3.2. Types of Peace Operations Mandates
Variable

Definition

Peace Monitoring

A fact-finding mission observing specific actions and reporting findings
to an international organization.

Peacekeeping

Deployment of troops following a ceasefire agreement to serve as an
interpositional buffer between belligerents; requires the consent of all
parties to the conflict, impartiality, and the minimum use of force; goal is
to prevent the resumption of hostilities by preventing accidental
engagement of opposing forces, deliberate cheating on ceasefire terms,
and to apply international pressure to deter a resumption of violence.

Peace Enforcement

Proactive missions designed to restore peace and redress aggression with
the significant use of military coercion; does not require the consent of the
host nation.

Peacebuilding

The creation of a new environment, not merely the cessation of hostilities,
dedicated to decreasing the opportunity to resort to violence and creating
mechanisms to manage conflicts peacefully.

Source: Sandler (2017).
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Table 3.3. Mandate Tasks Variables

Variable

Monitoring

Incorporated into PeaceKeeping
Enforcement

Building

Observe and Report

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Physical Separation of Belligerents
Consent of the Belligerents
Demilitarization of Belligerents:
Disarmament
Demobilization
Reintegration

Sometimes

Sometimes
Sometimes
Sometimes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Government Capacity Development:
Organize Elections
Train Security Forces

No

No

Sometimes

Yes

Required Size of Force

30-100

100-1000

1,000-10,000

>5,000

Yes

Yes
Sometimes
Sometimes

Yes
Sometimes
Sometimes

Intervenor Armament Capabilities:
Small Arms
Armored Vehicles
Combat Aviation Support

(Sometimes)
Yes

Sources: Diehl and Balas (2014); Sandler (2017); Williams (2016).

Force Composition and Capacity. The organizing agency and troop contributors
have a direct impact on the capacity of a mission to employ its mandated tasks. The
agency and the troops assigned must implement the mission mandate. It is therefore
essential for the agency to be able to manage the mission and for the troops to be capable
to carry out the tasks assigned.
African peace operations are led by one of several common organizing agency
models. The UN has led the largest number of missions with 33 missions in the study
group. The AU/OAU is the next most common organizing agency with 21 missions.
Non-African international organizations such as the EU and the Commonwealth of
Nations have led 10 missions. African regional economic communities have led nine
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missions. Individual sovereign countries have led nine missions. Ad hoc coalitions have
led four missions.
UN operations are those authorized by the UN Security Council, implemented
under the supervision of the UN Secretary General, and with senior leaders who function
as UN civil service employees. These missions enjoy UN support structures such as
DPKO institutional support including standardized doctrine, supply procurement, and
field support. Since 2005 the UN Peacebuilding Commission has also aided missions by
serving as an advisory body to UN missions (Diehl & Balas, 2014).
AU, OAU prior to 2002, operations are those authorized, constructed, and
implemented under the auspices of either the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,
Management and Resolution or the AU Peace and Security Council. The OAU missions
remained mostly small observation missions. The Peace and Security Council (PSC)
included two bodies; the Military Staff Committee and the Commissioner in Charge of
Peace and Security. These two bodies have increased the AU’s capacity for supporting
more robust operations. AU missions since 2003 have had the support of these bodies
and have reported to the Chairperson of the PSC (Diehl & Balas, 2014).
Missions led by non-African international organizations have included the EU and
the Commonwealth of Nations. Both groups have focused on smaller supporting
missions with a narrow focus in support of a larger UN or AU mission. The
Commonwealth of Nations missions have been authorized and managed by the Royal
Commonwealth Society on an ad hoc basis (Royal Commonwealth Society, 2016). The
EU missions relied on a more established support infrastructure supported by the EU
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Peace and Security Committee that was responsible for mission support and management.
Non-African international organizations led missions focused on niche support of larger
missions.
Regional economic communities have been the intervenor of last resort.
ECOWAS, ECCAS, IGAD, SADC, and others have intervened when others would not
(Balas, 2011). Their focus has been on peace enforcement missions into active conflicts.
Missions in Sierra Leone (ECOMOG-SL), Liberia (ECOMOG-L), and the Central
African Republic (MICOPAX and FOMUC) have fallen into this pattern. The
organizations lack established support structures and function on an ad hoc basis. They
frequently have deployed peace enforcement operations due to the consensus-based (no
requirement of unanimity) decision making of their organizations (Diehl & Balas, 2014).
Individual sovereign nations and ad hoc coalitions have led relevant peace
operations on 14 occasions. In each instance these interventions have relied on the
endemic capacities of the nations that acted. The majority of these have received UN
security council authorization and have served to bolster either a UN, AU, or regional
economic community mission in need. Their mandates have either been to enforce peace
so that an established mission may focus on its peacekeeping or peacebuilding mandate
or to fulfill a niche mission set in support of a larger mission. These niche peacebuilding
activities enable nations to contribute to the success of a mission without placing their
forces under the command of the said mission (Williams, 2016).
Troop capacity is the essential link between what the mission aspires to do, the
mandate, and what the mission does, the output. Logic dictates that a mandate will fail if
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the force charged with implementation has neither the requisite expertise nor tools at its
disposal. The examples of this have been many in peace operation history. MINUSCA’s
undertrained and poorly equipped forces have been unable to achieve mandated
protection of civilians task (Amnesty International, 2016). ONUMOZ struggled to
deploy its forces to rural Mozambique not due to a lack of equipment, but due to a
shortage of trained drivers (Jett, 1999).
Hass and Ansorg’s study (2018) demonstrated the success of mandate execution
was dependent on quality of forces not quantity. Specifically, they found that troop
quality and capacity were directly linked to the successful protection of civilians and
other tasks associated with more robust mandates. Their study explained the mismatch
between larger forces that have failed and smaller forces that have succeeded. Haass and
Ansorg found causation to be a combination of better training, more equipment, and
higher levels of political support (2018).
I adopted Haass and Ansorg’s measure of a troop contributing country’s (TCC)
military expenditure per number of armed personnel (spending per capita) to assess the
capacity of peace operations soldiers. The troop spending per capita figures were created
by dividing a nation’s total military expenditure by total number of military personnel.
The calculation was based upon on numbers from the year a mission was initiated and
measured in constant 2016 USD. This formula provided a quantifiable proxy measure of
assumed military capacity. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database (2018) provided the military spending numbers.
The Military Balance annual publication by the International Institute for Strategic
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Studies (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990-2015) provided the number of
armed service members for each country.
This proxy is an imperfect measure. Spending per capita is an input. A forces’
ability to take actions in support of a mission is the true output. However, expenditures
are widely accepted as a measure of military capability (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). The
formula is the best available measure as it encapsulates both the equipment a military
possesses as well as the training of its military forces. Higher spending per soldier
equates better equipment and training (Haass & Ansorg, 2018).
Post-Cold War frequently employed assistance programs to augment the training,
equipping, and sustainment of peace operation forces. It was therefore necessary to
examine the impact of these programs on the capability of forces to conduct mandated
tasks in pursuit of a successful peace operation. The presence of African Contingency
Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) program or African Crisis Response Initiative
(ACRI) trained forces and African Peace Facility (APF) mission support were examined
as additional independent variables. These programs affected the same capability factors
Haass and Ansorg identified as affecting success. These programs support to training,
equipping, and sustaining peace operations forces has been key to force development in
support of African peace operations (Varhola & Varhola, 2011).
Table 3.4 below consolidated the factors that impact the peace operation force
capacity. The variables have been categorized into those dealing with a mission’s lead
organization; the quantity and origin of its troops; and the capacity of those troops. These
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variables were essential to test linkages between intervenor and mandate in my basic
theory of peace operations.
Table 3.4. Peace Operation Force Composition and Capacity
Variable

Indicator Measures

Lead Organization






UN
AU/OAU
Regional Economic Communities (RECs)
Individual Countries or Ad hoc Coalitions

Personnel





Intervenor force composition
Number of countries represented
Country representation and proportion of total force

Resources



Troop contributing country military expenditure per armed force
member
Training & equipment support from major power? yes/no.
Primary major power supporter (UK, US, France, etc)




Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees (2016); Mullenbach (2018); International
Peace Institute (2018); World Bank (2018); SIPRI (2018); IISS (1990-2015); Williams (2016).

Peace Operations Outcomes. Scholarly works of peace operations have too often
delved into the reasons why an operation succeeded or failed without first defining how
the assessment was reached (Diehl & Balas, 2014). Terms such as success or failure
have little value unless specifically defined. I have defined success by means of a twopart question. First, was either peace established, or the mission transferred? Second, if
established was peace resilient for five years? Resilient peace was defined as the absence
of either war or another deployed peace operation during the five-year period. Potential
outcomes were complete success, partial success, or failure. Complete success was
defined as peace established and resilient in excess of five years. Partial success was
defined as either peace established and lasted less than five years or mission transferred
to another peace operation. Failure was defined as a mission withdrawing during a time
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of war or transferring after a new war erupted. For example, UNAMIR I was coded as a
failure despite it transferring to UNAMIR II which would be coded a partial success.
UNAMIR I was a failure due to the Second Rwandan War beginning during its
deployment. UNAMIR II deployed during the Second Rwandan War, and closed after
the establishment of a peace that lasted less than five years. I utilized the decision
template developed by Diehl and Druckman (2015) and elaborated by Peter (2016) to
produce this definition. The section below explains selection criteria and defines specific
terminology used in the research analysis.
The peace operation success decision template was designed to assist in the
scoping of studies. Diehl and Druckman’s template had three questions to be asked
during study design. These questions were: who are the stakeholders, what is the time
perspective, and what is the assessment standard. Peter added, what is the type of peace
operation, to the template. My definition was created via this template. A discussion of
the four questions below demonstrates the logic chain that produced my definition.
“Success for whom?” was the framework’s first question. I chose success for the
international community who supports the peace operation. All peace operations seek to
ameliorate conflict conditions and ultimately to end the conflict (Diehl & Balas, 2014).
Therefore, it is a logical position for a quantitative study of peace operations to analyze
whether the investment, the operation, produced the desired outcome, the absence of war.
This response may not be adequately concise for a detailed case study nor a comparative
analysis that sought more causation and less correlation.
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The selection of a short-term or long-term time frame is the second question. I
assessed the resilience of peace at the five-year post intervention closure date. Peace was
considered resilient there has been no further armed peace operations nor named conflicts
per the Correlates of War standard at the five-year mark. The peace was considered not
to be resilient if these standards were not met. For example, the ECOMICI peace
keeping mission in Cote d’Ivoire was not coded as producing a resilient peace as both the
peace keeping Operation Licorne and the peacebuilding ONUCI missions would be
present for more than 10 years after the end of ECOMICI.
The selection of five-years was made to ensure sufficient time had lapsed to
demonstrate the resilience of peace. A return to conflict post withdrawal demonstrates
that the mission, while successful at halting violence, was unsuccessful in the
superordinate goal. Timeframes for similar studies range from two to ten years (Diehl &
Druckman, 2015). Selection on the lower end of the model is advantageous for policy
makers who seek a rapid response and fidelity that the mission was responsible for the
conditions at time of assessment. As time duration increases the conditions on the
ground are influenced by an increasing number of factors that were not present at the
time of mission completion. However, a longer duration reduces the impact of short-term
trend and increases fidelity on the resilience of conditions created by the mission.
The framework’s third point is definition of the baseline from which success is
measured. My selection was to establish the baseline for success as no further armed
peace interventions nor named conflicts per the Correlates of War project at the time of
evaluation. This selection sought to avoid three traps associated with similar academic
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studies. The postulating of counterfactual analysis requires the creation of an alternative
reality in which no action is taken. The reality is that there are other options such as
sanctions and diplomacy available to the international community. I have also sought to
avoid the minimalist definition of any improvement. A well planned and resourced peace
operation should be expected to produce something greater “one death fewer per annum”.
The third trap is to compare the situation after the mission to the situation at the time of
deployment. This creates a selection bias where missions appear to be more or less
successful depending on if they deployed to an area during active conflict or during a
ceasefire (Peter, 2016). My baseline was designed to provide feedback to my
stakeholders, the international community, on the success or failure of their superordinate
goal, the establishment of resilient peace.
The fourth question, what to include in the population of peace operations, is
designed to maximize the comparison of like and like operations. Most studies have
focused on either one category of operation or kept missions segregated into categories
for comparative reasons. My study has fallen under the latter category. I have included
all operations meeting the following definition: the deployment of police and/or military
forces to assist in the prevention or cessation of armed conflict by serving to observe or
assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements; enforcement of ceasefires
or peace agreements; or to build a stable peace (Williams, 2013). I segregated these
missions based on mandates categories of monitor, peacekeeping, peace enforcement,
and peacebuilding. These categories facilitated both the comparison of like with like
missions and the evaluation of outcome trends by mission type.
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My answers to the framework’s questions produced a definition of success that
enabled comparison among and between the 86 missions identified in the study. The
question of success identifies output and impact resulting in the three potential answers;
complete success, partial success, or failure.
My definition of success was similar to many other studies that asked what was
the output, peace or no peace, and the impact, resilient peace. These included the works
of Fortna (2008) and Fiedler (2000). My output varied slight from the others in that I
incorporated mission transfer into the structure. The three potential outputs identified
whether the mission was successful and to what degree. See Table 3.5 below for the
measurements of success, the dependent variable.
Table 3.5. Peace Operations Outcome Variables
Variable

Indicator Measure

Peace at mission end

yes or no

Mission transfer

yes or no

Outbreak of war during deployment

yes or no

Peace maintained 5 years

yes or no

The potential outputs based on this model are as follows:


Complete Mission Success: Peace was established prior to mission
departure, and peace was resilient for a period of five-years.



Partial Mission Success: Peace was established prior to mission
departure or mission responsibilities transferred to another
operation. Any peace established was not resilient to the five-year
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mark as indicated by the deployment of another peace operation or
the outbreak of a named war.


Mission Failure: Peace was not established and mission withdrew;
or mission transferred after a new war began.

This measurement of success indicates if a mission resolved a conflict, produced
some positives outcomes, or failed. Failure indicates the intervenor was unable to
establish peace and withdrew. Missions which failed to prevent the onset of a new war
and then transferred are also determined to be failures. Partial Success correlates a
failure of the mandate to fully address the underlying root causes of conflict. Any peace
established by a partially successful mission proved resilient for less than five years as
indicated by the eruption of a named war or the deployment of a subsequent peace
operation. A partially successful mission may have also produced some positive
outcomes before transferring to another operation. Complete success indicated that the
operation was capable of producing peace and that the mission addressed the conflict
conditions sufficiently to make that peace resilient.
Mission Completion Terms: Transition and Close. These are not used in the same
construct as utilized in the 2008 UN Capstone project. In the UN Capstone the term
transition refers to the end of military involvement and the transition to a wholly civilian
mission set under a new name and structure. This study is focused on interventions with
a military aspect. As such, the terms are utilized in a manner germane to the study’s
purpose.
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Transfer or transition refers to a mission whose responsibilities are transferred
from one to another named mission. These missions may be led by different
organizations; may or utilize the same personnel; and may add or subtract from the
mandated responsibilities. Peace operations focused on the Darfur Rebellion are a
seminal example of transition. The response to Darfur began with an AU led observation
mission, transitioned to an AU led peacekeeping mission, and then transitioned to a
hybrid AU/UN led mission. The transition from observation to peacekeeping maintained
the same leadership but changed the mandate and the personnel. The second transition
maintained the same personnel but changed leadership.
Close refers to a mission whose end does not coincide with a transfer of
responsibility to another mission involving military personnel. Often times, these
missions do not close all offices, but change into a solely civilian mission focused on
providing assistance to local authorities and continuing the peace building actions of a
mission. However, these civilian missions do not include a military element and conduct
operations on a level below those specifically defined as peace operations.
Summary
This chapter examined the variables connected to conflict characteristics, mandate
type, and intervenor capacity as well as their impacts on the chain of success or failure
connecting these independent variables with the dependent variable. My study examined
all peace operations in post-Cold War Sub-Saharan Africa. Information began with
Williams’ (2016) list of peace operations and was augmented by the conflict and
intervention descriptions in Chapter 2. Variables that affected the success or failure of
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peace operations were identified from previous studies discussed in Chapter 1 and
elaborated on in this chapter. These variables were categorized into those that pertained
to the conflict, the mandate, and the intervening force.
This chapter explained these variables and their impacts. Numerous conflict
related variables were found to increase or decrease the likelihood of a successful
intervention. Qualitative analysis of conflicts is concluded in Chapter 4 and categorizes
conflicts based on the presence or absence of these variables. Also discussed were
mandate variables that delineate operations as being either a peace monitoring,
peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or peacebuilding mission type. Finally, those
variables that impact force capacity including the construction of a proxy figure were
discussed. These variables have been shown to measure the ability of an implementing
force to accomplish its mandated tasks. These independent variables all influence the
The following chapter tests my nine hypotheses to examine the peace operations
discussed in Chapter 2 by means of the variables presented in this chapter. This
hypothesis testing provides answers on the relationships between and outputs produced
by various conflicts complexities, mandate types, and intervenor capacity.
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CHAPTER FOUR: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
This chapter examines each of the hypotheses listed at the beginning of the
Methodology chapter, in order to test the basic theory of peace operations outlined in
Figure 1.1. in the Introductory chapter. The logic of this theory is that the conflict
conditions existing in an African country will be addressed by the peace operations
mandate to be carried out by military forces charged to achieve conflict settlement
conditions that ameliorate violence and establish and enforce a sustaining peace
agreement.
Peace Operations Data
The data descriptions in Chapter 2 provided the basic information on variables
listed in the Methodology chapter, augmented by Williams’ (2016) list of 83 African
peace operations that occurred between 1990 and 2015 (including mission name,
location, dates, and deployed size) plus three additional peace operations not included in
Williams’ list, for a total of 86 cases. I expanded Williams’ data to incorporate these
three additional cases to incorporate one recent mission and two that met my peace
operation criteria, but did not appear on his list. The French operations Turquoise was
included in my list as it received UN authorization and deployed into a Sub-Saharan
country during the relevant timeframe. Williams’ did not provide a reason for not
including Operation Turquoise, but may have omitted the operations due to the debate as
to if France’s goal was in line with the UN mandate (Conroy, 2018). Operation Barkhane
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was the successor mission to Operation Serval and was included to update Williams’ list.
I counted AMIS 1 and AMIS 2 as separate missions to accommodate for the change in
mandate and force structure brought by the transition. Considering AMIS as two separate
missions is also in line with the official position of the EU and others (Janos, 2009).
Williams himself included the EU Support to AMIS 2 mission in his list but did not
differentiate AMIS 2 as a separate mission from AMIS 1. Table 4.1 shows basic
information about each mission, organized alphabetically by country of deployment, and
the mission outcome using the measures described in the Methodology chapter.
Table 4.1. Sub Saharan African Peace Operations: 1990-2015
Country

Type

Lead Org

Name

Start Date

End Date

Outcome*

Angola

MON
PKO
PKO

UN
UN
UN

1/3/1989
5/1/1991
2/1/1995

6/6/1991
2/1/1995
6/1/1997

Partial Success
Failure
Partial Success

PKO

UN

UNAVEM I
UNAVEM II
UNAVEM
III
MONUA

6/1/1997

3/20/1999

Failure

MON
PKO

OAU
AU

OMIB
SAPSD****

12/7/1993
10/27/2001

7/31/1996
8/8/2009

PKO
PBO+

AU
UN

AMIB
ONUB

2/12/2003
5/21/2004

5/20/2004
12/31/2006

PEO

MISAB

2/1/1997

4/1/1998

PBO+
PEO
PEO
PEO
PEO

Inter-African
Force
UN
CEN-SAD
CEMAC
ECCAS
France

Failure
Complete
Success
Partial Success
Complete
Success
Partial Success

4/1/1998
2/1/2002
10/1/2002
6/20/2008
12/5/2013

2/1/2000
12/28/2002
7/1/2008
12/19/2013
10/31/2016

Partial Success
Partial Success
Partial Success
Failure
Partial Success

PKO
PKO

AU
EU

12/19/2013
9/15/2014

9/15/2014
3/15/2015

Partial Success
Partial Success

PBO+

UN

MINURCA
CEN-SAD
FOMUC
MICOPAX
Operation
Sangaris**
MISCA
EUFOR
RCA**
MINUSCA

9/15/2014

3/30/2019

Ongoing

Burundi

CAR
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Chad

Comoros

Cote d'Ivoire

DRC

Ethiopia and
Eritrea

GuineaBissau

MON

UN

UNASOG

5/1/1994

6/1/1994

PBO

UN

MINURCAT

9/25/2007

12/31/2010

PKO

EU

EUFORChad**

1/28/2008

3/15/2009

MON
MON
MON
MON

OAU
AU
AU
AU

11/25/1997
11/27/2001
3/15/2002
3/9/2004

5/30/1999
2/2/2002
5/15/2002
5/9/2004

Failure
Partial Success
Partial Success
Partial Success

MON
PKO

AU
AU

OMIC
OMIC 2
OMIC 3
MIOC /
OMIC4
AMISEC
MAES

3/21/2006
5/9/2007

6/9/2006
10/30/2008

PEO

AU

Democracy
in the
Comoros**

3/25/2008

4/30/2008

Partial Success
Complete
Success
Complete
Success

PEO

France

9/22/2002

1/21/2015

PKO
MON
PBO+

ECOWAS
UN
UN

Operation
Licorne**
ECOMICI
MINUCI
ONUCI

10/1/2002
5/13/2003
4/4/2004

4/4/2004
4/4/2004
6/30/2017

MON

OAU

11/16/1999

11/30/2000

Partial
Success***
Partial Success
Partial Success
Partial
Success***
Partial Success

PKO
PBO+
PEO

UN
UN
EU

11/30/1999
1/1/2002
6/1/2003

1/1/2002
6/30/2010
9/1/2003

Partial Success
Partial Success
Partial Success

PBO

EU

1/1/2005

3/30/2019

Ongoing

PBO

EU

4/25/2006

9/1/2006

Partial Success

PBO+

UN

7/1/2010

3/30/2019

Ongoing

MON

AU

7/31/2000

7/31/2008

PKO

UN

OLMEE,
AULMEE**
UNMEE

7/31/2000

7/31/2008

PKO

ECOWAS

12/26/1998

6/7/1999

PBO

EU

ECOMOGGB
EU SSR

2/12/2008

9/30/2010

Complete
Success
Complete
Success
Complete
Success
Failure

OAU
Observer
Mission
MONUC-a
MONUC-b
Operation
Artemis**
EUSECCONGO**
EUFORRD**
MONUSCO
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Complete
Success
Complete
Success
Complete
Success

PBO

Anglola

MISSANGGB
ECOMIB

3/21/2011

6/9/2012

Failure

PKO

ECOWAS

5/16/2012

6/30/2017

Ongoing

Lake Chad
Basin

PEO

MNJTF+Benin

MNJTF vs
Boko Haram

10/7/2014

3/30/2019

Ongoing

Liberia

PEO
MON
PKO
PEO

ECOWAS
UN
ECOWAS
US

8/24/1990
9/1/1993
8/4/2003
8/14/2003

2/2/1998
9/1/1997
9/30/2003
9/30/2003

Partial Success
Partial Success
Partial Success
Partial Success

PBO+

UN

ECOMOG-L
UNOMIL**
ECOMIL
JTF
Liberia**
UNMIL

10/1/2003

3/30/2018

PEO
PEO

AU/ECOWAS
France

12/20/2012
1/11/2013

4/1/2013
7/15/2014

PBO

EU

2/1/2013

3/30/2019

Ongoing

PBO+
PEO

UN
France

AFISMA
Operation
Serval**
EUTM
Mali**
MINUSMA
Operation
Barkhane**

Partial
Success***
Partial Success
Partial Success

4/25/2013
8/1/2014

3/30/2019
3/30/2019

Ongoing
Ongoing

MON

JVC

12/1/1990

10/1/1992

Partial Success

PBO

Eight Allied
Nations
UN

ONUMOZ

12/1/1992

12/1/1994

Namibia

PBO

UN

UNTAG

4/1/1989

3/1/1990

Rwanda

MON
MON

OAU
OAU

4/1/1991
9/1/1991

9/1/1991
7/1/1992

MON

OAU

8/1/1992

11/1/1993

Partial Success

PKO
PBO+
PEO

UN
UN
France

10/1/1993
5/18/1994
6/1/1994

5/17/1994
3/1/1996
7/1/1994

Failure
Partial Success
Failure

Rwanda/
Uganda

MON

UN

OAU MOT
OAU
NMOG I
OAU
NMOG II
UNAMIR I
UNAMIR II
Operation
Turquoise**
UNOMUR

Complete
Success
Complete
Success
Partial Success
Partial Success

6/1/1993

9/1/1994

Failure

Sierra Leone

PEO

ECOWAS

6/1/1997

5/2/2000

Failure

MON
PBO+

UN
UN

7/13/1998
10/22/1999

10/21/1999
12/31/2005

Partial Success
Complete
Success

Mali

Mali and
others
Mozambique

ECOMOGSL
UNOMSIL
UNAMSIL
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Somalia

PEO

UK

Palliser**

5/1/2000

6/15/2000

PBO+

UK

Basilica and
Silkman**

6/16/2000

1/1/2005

PKO
PEO

UN
Coalition of 20
nations
UN
AU
EU

UNOSOM I
UNITAF**

4/1/1992
12/1/1992

3/1/1993
3/1/1993

Partial Success
Partial Success

UNOSOM II
AMISOM
EUTM
Somalia**

3/1/1993
1/19/2007
4/10/2010

3/1/1995
3/30/2019
3/30/2019

Failure
Ongoing
Ongoing

PBO+
PEO
PBO

Complete
Success
Complete
Success

South Africa

PBO

Commonwealth
of Nations

CPAG-SA

2/1/1994

4/9/1994

Complete
Success

South Sudan

PBO+

UN

UNMISS

6/9/2011

3/30/2019

Ongoing

Sudan

MON

UN

4/4/2002

6/20/2005

Partial Success

MON
PKO
PBO+
PKO

AU
AU
UN
EU

5/1/2004
10/1/2004
3/24/2005
7/18/2005

10/1/2004
1/1/2008
7/9/2011
12/31/2007

Partial Success
Partial Success
Partial Success
Partial Success

PBO+
PKO

UN/AU Joint
UN

JMC and
IMU
AMIS 1
AMIS 2
UNMIS
EU Support
to AMIS 2**
UNAMID
UNISFA

7/31/2007
6/27/2011

3/30/2019
3/30/2019

Ongoing
Ongoing

MON

OAU

1/1/1991

4/1/1991

Partial Success

PKO

UN

4/1/1991

3/30/2019

Ongoing

Western
Sahara

OAU
Mission to
W. Sahara
MINURSO

* Complete mission success: mandate tasks completed, peace established by mission departure, lasted at
least 5 years; Partial mission success: mandate tasks completed, peace established but short-lived;
Mission failure: mandate tasks not completed, peace not established. Unknown: mandate tasks
completed, peace established, less than 5 years passed since mission closure.
** Parallel supporting mission. A mission deployed to complement another peace operation (e.g. EU
Support to AMIS 2 provided planning, technical assistance, and troop training in support of AMIS 2).
*** Successful mission where elapsed time since mission closure has not reached the five years of peace
criterion for complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research.
**** SAPSD stand-alone, then parallel, then standalone mission.
+ Peacebuilding Operation with UN Chapter VII deterrence authorized in mandate.
Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees (2016); Mullenbach (2018); Williams (2016).
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The following paragraphs present initial observations from the data in Table 4.1.
My study identified 86 peace operations deployed to 23 countries or contiguous regions
in response to 33 periods of conflict. These missions were dispersed between lead
organizations with 33 UN led, 21 AU led, nine regional economic community led, and 23
“Other” missions that were atypically organized and led. These missions were spread
between mandates with 21 peace monitoring, 20 peacekeeping, 19 peace enforcement,
and 26 peacebuilding missions. Results were mixed with 16 mission completely
successful, 44 missions partially successful, 12 failed missions, and 14 missions either
ongoing or recently concluded.
Mission duration showed a slight correlation between longer missions and
success. It also highlighted the trend towards longer missions. The average mission
duration was 943 days (about 2.5 years). The shortest mission, Operation Turquoise,
lasted a mere 30 days while the longest mission, UNMIL, lasted 5,294 days (about 14.5
years). Missions that were completely successful averaged 979 (about 2.7 years); those
that were partial successful 696 days (about 1.9 years); and failed missions averaged 709
(almost 2 years). The most significant statistic was that those successfully completed in
the past five years averaged 4,878 days (over 13 years) and those ongoing would have
averaged 3,536 days (about 9.7 years) if they were simultaneously completed on April
20, 2019 (the cutoff date for this research). Longer duration missions were loosely
associated with resilient peace outputs and more recent missions have been much longer
than average.
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UN led missions were the plurality composing 33 of the 86 missions analyzed.
The UN led missions across the spectrum of mandates including seven peace monitoring,
eight peacekeeping, three peace enforcement, and 15 peacebuilding missions. UN
missions were successful 21 times; with seven completely successful and 14 partially
successful. Five UN missions ended in complete failure and seven are ongoing. UN
missions that have closed were on average deployed for 1,345 days (about 3.7 years);
significantly longer than average.
The African Union (AU or OAU) led 21 missions. These missions included 13
peace monitoring, five peacekeeping, and three peace enforcing missions. Outcomes
were generally positive with four complete successes, 14 partial successes, two failures,
and one mission, AMISOM, ongoing. AU missions that have closed were on average
deployed for 584 days (1.6 years); significantly shorter than average.
Regional economic communities have led nine peace operations in my study.
These missions were split between four peacekeeping and five peace building missions.
Outcomes were mixed with one complete success, five partial successes, two failures,
and one ongoing. Regional Economic Community led missions that have closed were on
average deployed for 1,124 days (just over three years); slightly longer than average.
23 peace operations were otherwise organized, i.e. they were not led by the four
key players I identified. These operations were divided across the spectrum of missions
with one peace monitoring mission, three peacekeeping missions, 11 peace enforcement
missions, and eight peacebuilding missions. Outcomes were mixed with five complete
successes, 10 partial successes, three failures, and five missions ongoing. These missions
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that have closed were on average deployed for 681 days (about 1.8 years); significantly
shorter than average.
Peace monitoring missions were relatively successful with 18 of 21 missions rated
successful. However, there were only two instances, OLMEE and UNASOG, of a
resilient peace being established after the closure of a monitoring mission. The 16 other
occasions were rated as partially successful. On five occasions either a new conflict or
the deployment of another peace operation occurred within five years of mission closure.
In 11 occasions the mission transferred to peacekeeping or peacebuilding mission.
A majority, 13, of peace monitoring missions were led by the AU. The UN led
seven and one, JVC Mozambique, was led by an ad hoc coalition. As previously stated
11 missions transferred to larger missions. Five of the 13 AU missions transitioned to
UN missions. Many peace monitoring missions served as a trip-wire to larger
internationalized responses to African conflicts.
Peacekeeping missions were completely successful five times, partially successful
10 times, twice resulted in failure, and three missions are ongoing. These positive
outcomes are not surprising given most major studies have determined the two
prerequisites for peacekeeping, an existing cease-fire and belligerent consent, are
prerequisites for peace operations success in general (Fortna, 2008; Diehl, 1994; Heldt,
2001; Greig & Diehl, 2005; Fiedler, 2000).
Peacekeeping missions were led by a variety of intervening forces. UN forces led
eight, the AU led five, regional economic communities led four and the EU led three. All
non-UN led missions were either a partial or complete success with one currently
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undetermined. The UN had a mixed outcome with two complete failures (UNAMIR I
and MONUA), three partial successes (UNOSOM I, UNAVEM III, and MONUC-a), and
two complete successes (UNMEE and ONUB).
The figures for peace enforcement confirm Fortna’s assessment that enforcement
missions were likely stop fighting but unlikely to produce resilient peace (2003). Peace
enforcement operations produced a complete success only twice and then only when
deployed as a parallel supporting mission. They were partially successful 11 times, a
failure on three occasions, and three missions are ongoing. Regional economic
communities led the majority of completed peace enforcement missions including the
two of three failures, MICOPAX and ECOMOG-SL.
Peacebuilding operations were relatively successful with seven complete
successes and seven partial successes. Additionally, two of the partial successes may yet
prove resilient when the five-year post closure date is reached for ONUCI and UNMIL.
Four peacebuilding missions failed and eight are ongoing. The UN led the majority of
peacebuilding missions. They were partially successful in four of eleven missions and
completely successful in five of eleven. Two of the non-UN missions in this data set
were complete failures. EU SSR and MISSANG-GB were both small scale operations
with limited objectives and even more limited means. They were withdrawn when failure
appeared inevitable.
The information provided in Table 4.1 demonstrated the variety of operations by
outcome, mandate, duration, and lead agency. The hypotheses testing elaborated on these
cursory observations by examining the conflict itself, the mandates, the intervening force
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capacity, and the relationships to other peace operations. The examination of these
elements identified patterns that were more likely to produce desirable outcomes. These
conclusions are listed by hypothesis in the following section with a summarization
following the hypotheses.
Hypothesis Testing
My hypotheses focus on the relationships between various elements of a peace
operation. The first hypothesis examines the relationship between the conflict
characteristics and the peace operation mandate. The second hypothesis examines the
relationship between the mandate and the force capability sent to implement that
mandate. The third and fourth hypothesis examines the effect of intervening force
capacity on mission outcome. The final five hypotheses look at specific issues that may
impact the effectiveness of an operation.
The analysis for each section relied on 66 of the identified 86 peace operations.
The outcomes of 20 parallel supporting operations were not included in the results.
These missions were factored as an independent variable affecting the outcome of the
missions they supported. Counting the outcome of these parallel operations would have
double count their impact. 14 included missions were ongoing at the time of this study.
A further seven had not passed the five-years post-mission closure point required for
assessment of impact. Four of these missions (Operation Sangaris, EUFOR RCA, MISA,
and Operation Serval) were partially successful, but did not produce a resilient peace.
Three of these missions (ONUCI, UNMIL, and Operation Licorne) were counted as
partially successful, but may transition to completely successful at a later date. In
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summation, missions included in calculations were those deployed to directly address the
conflict, not to augment an existing mission addressing the conflict, and include ongoing
as well as recently closed operations.
Hypothesis 1: The Conflict Characteristics determine the peace operation
mandate. The data in Table 4.2 displayed the level of conflict complexity, type of peace
operation, and the mission outcome. The relationship between complex conflicts and
robust peace operations was demonstrated by which mandate types have been deployed
to specific conflicts. Conflicts were qualitatively assessed into each category based on
the variables identified in Table 3.1 and categorized into categories of high, medium, or
low complexity. The variables from Table 3.1 were those identified as having the
greatest impact on making a conflict resilient to peace and reducing the likelihood of
intervention success in previous studies by Fortna (2004, 2008), Doyal and Sabanis
(2006), Fiedler (2000), Diehl and Balas (2014), and Walter (2010). The most significant
of these variables were the presence of an intra-state war with external support to the
rebels (Williams, 2016) and the absence of a cease-fire or peace agreement signed by all
belligerent groups (Fortna, 2008).
Highly complex conflicts are those that exhibit all or most of the features found to
increase the likelihood of conflict reoccurrence and minimize the likelihood of
interventions success. Africa’s World War was the most complex conflict analyzed. It
had greater than three belligerent groups, more than 100,000 individuals under arms,
external support to rebel forces, readily lootable resources to fund the conflict, high
annual deaths due to violence, no cease-fire agreed to by all parties to the conflict, and a
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low local capacity. All these factors add to the challenge of peace operation intervention
and lessen the ease of successfully establishing a resilient peace. Unfortunately, these
ingredients have been common to post-Cold War conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa.
A medium complexity conflict presents serious challenges to a peace operation,
but at a lesser level than a highly complex conflict. These conflicts possess some, but not
all of the variables that diminish the likelihood of a successful peace operation outcome.
They possess some mitigating factors such as a peace agreement, only two belligerent
groups, or a highly developed economy. The Burundian conflicts were examples of
medium complex conflicts. The conflicts were intrastate wars with moderate levels of
violence and low local capacity. External support to rebels was limited, there were no
readily lootable resources, and ceasefire agreements were in place prior to mission
deployment.
Low complexity conflicts are those that do not present serious barriers to peace
operation intervention. These conflicts were frequently interstate conflicts with a
ceasefire or peace agreement in place. The South African Border was in Namibia was
one such conflict. Namibia’s long duration of conflict and intrastate fight with external
support were mitigated by the presence of a peace agreement and low levels of violence.
In another example, the Badme Border War was a long and bloody war but was an
interstate conflict with an existent cease-fire at the time of intervention. Low complexity
conflicts have features in place that better facilitate the unopposed introduction of a peace
operation.
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Table 4.2. Conflict Complexity and Peace Operation Mandate: Mission Outcome
Country

Conflict*

Mission Name

Mandate

Mission Outcome

High Complexity (N = 8 Countries; N = 38 Peace Operations)
Angola

Angolan Control
War

UNAVEM I

MON

Partial Success

CAR

Intrastate Conflict

CEN-SAD
FOMUC
MICOPAX
Operation
Sangaris**
MISCA
EUFOR RCA**
MINUSCA

PEO
PEO
PEO
PEO

Partial Success
Partial Success
Failure
Partial Success

PKO
PKO
PBO+

Partial Success
Partial Success
Ongoing

OAU Observer
Msn
MONUC-a
MONUC-b
Operation
Artemis**
EUSECCONGO**
EUFOR-RD**
MONUSCO

MON

Partial Success

PKO
PBO+
PEO

Partial Success
Partial Success
Partial Success

PBO

Ongoing

PBO
PBO+

Partial Success
Ongoing

1st and 2nd Liberia
Wars
2nd Liberia War
Liberia-LURD
War

ECOMOG-L

PEO

Partial Success

UNOMIL**
ECOMIL
JTF Liberia**
UNMIL

MON
PKO
PEO
PBO+

Partial Success
Partial Success
Partial Success
Partial Success***

First Sierra Leone
War
Second Sierra
Leone War

ECOMOG-SL

PEO

Failure

UNOMSIL
UNAMSIL
Palliser**
Basilica and
Silkman**

MON
PBO+
PEO
PBO+

Partial Success
Complete Success
Complete Success
Complete Success

2nd Somali War

UNOSOM I
UNITAF**

PKO
PEO

Partial Success
Partial Success

CAR War

DRC

Liberia

Sierra Leone

Somalia

Africa’s World
War
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rd

3 Somali War

UNOSOM II
AMISOM
EUTM
Somalia**

PBO+
PEO
PBO

Failure
Ongoing
Ongoing

South Sudan

South Sudanese
Civil War

UNMISS

PBO+

Ongoing

Sudan

Darfur Rebellion

JMC and IMU
AMIS 1
AMIS 2
EU Support to
AMIS 2**
UNAMID
UNMIS
UNISFA

MON
MON
PKO
PKO

Partial Success
Partial Success
Partial Success
Partial Success

PBO+
PBO+
PKO

Ongoing
Partial Success
Ongoing

nd

2 South Sudan
War

Medium Complexity (N = 9 Countries; N = 30 Peace Operations)
Angola

Angolan War of
the Cities

UNAVEM II
UNAVEM III
MONUA

PKO
PKO
PKO

Failure
Partial Success
Failure

Burundi

Second Burundi
War
Third Burundi War

OMIB

MON

Failure

SAPSD****
AMIB
ONUB

PKO
PKO
PBO+

Complete Success
Partial Success
Complete Success

CAR

Intrastate Conflict

MISAB
MINURCA

PEO
PBO+

Partial Success
Partial Success

Chad

Chad-United
Opposition War

MINURCAT
EUFOR-Chad**

PBO
PKO

Complete Success
Complete Success

Cote d'Ivoire

1st Ivoirian Civil
War

Operation
Licorne**
ECOMICI
MINUCI
ONUCI

PEO

Partial Success***

PKO
MON
PBO+

Partial Success
Partial Success
Partial Success***

MNJTF

PEO

Ongoing

AFISMA

PEO

Partial Success

Lake Chad
Basin
Mali

Boko Haram War
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Tuareg
Independence War

Operation
Serval**
EUTM Mali**
MINUSMA
Operation
Barkhane**

PEO

Partial Success

PBO
PBO+
PEO

Ongoing
Ongoing
Ongoing

Mozambique

Mozambique War

JVC
ONUMOZ

MON
PBO

Partial Success
Complete Success

Rwanda

Intrastate Conflict

OAU MOT
OAU NMOG I
OAU NMOG II
UNOMUR
UNAMIR I
UNAMIR II
Operation
Turquoise**

MON
MON
MON
MON
PKO
PBO+
PEO

Partial Success
Partial Success
Partial Success
Failure
Failure
Partial Success
Failure

2nd Rwanda War

Low Complexity (N = 7 Countries; N = 18 Peace Operations)
Chad

Azouzou Strip
War

UNASOG

MON

Complete Success

Comoros

Intrastate Conflict

OMIC
OMIC 2
OMIC 3
MIOC / OMIC4
AMISEC
MAES
Democracy in the
Comoros**

MON
MON
MON
MON
MON
PKO
PEO

Failure
Partial Success
Partial Success
Partial Success
Partial Success
Complete Success
Complete Success

Ethiopia and
Eritrea

Badmee Border
War

OLMEE,
AULMEE**
UNMEE

MON

Complete Success

PKO

Complete Success

Guinea-Bissau

GB Military War
Intrastate Conflict

ECOMOG-GB
EU SSR
MISSANG-GB
ECOMIB

PKO
PBO
PBO
PKO

Complete Success
Failure
Failure
Ongoing

Namibia

South African
Border War

UNTAG

PBO

Complete Success

South Africa

Inkatha-ANC War

CPAG-SA

PBO

Complete Success
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Western
Sahara

Western Sahara
War

OAU Mission to
W. Sahara
MINURSO

MON

Partial Success

PKO

Ongoing

* Conflict names and durations from Sakees and Wayman (2010), and Dixon and Sarkees (2016).
“Intrastate conflict” label denotes period of less than war violence.
** Parallel supporting mission. A mission deployed to complement another peace operation.
*** Successful mission where elapsed time since mission closure has not reached the five years of peace
criterion for complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research.
**** SAPSD stand-alone, then parallel, then standalone mission.
+ Peacebuilding Operation with UN Chapter VII deterrence authorized in mandate.
Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees (2016); Mullenbach (2018); Williams (2016).

The analysis indicated a strong correlation between mission type and conflict
complexity. The more complex a conflict the more likely was the deployment of a
peacebuilding mission. This correlation was especially drastic when looking at robust
peacebuilding missions. Peace enforcement deployment displayed a similar array
favoring more complex conflicts. Peace monitoring missions were deployed in an
inverse pattern with a preponderance of low complexity conflicts receiving a peace
monitoring deployment. Peacekeeping missions were the only type to not display a
distinct pattern based on conflict complexity. The output demonstrated a strong link
between deployed mission type, excepting peacekeeping, and conflict complexity. The
data strongly supported hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 2: Peace Operations mandate determines the force capacity. It was
assumed that peace monitoring missions would deploy the smallest number of troops due
to their limited mission scope. Traditional peacekeeping missions were assumed to have
the next smallest force as their interpositional mission function requires sufficient
numbers to deter an attack. Peace enforcement missions were assumed to be larger than
peacekeeping due to the requirement that they contain sufficient numbers and capacities
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to deter or defeat belligerents acting against the interests of the mandate. Finally,
peacebuilding missions were assumed have the largest number of troops due to the varied
and complex mission tasks they carry out; many that encompass either in part or in whole
the mission tasks of other mission types. Table 4.3 was compiled to determine the mean
and median size of missions and capacity of deployed personnel categorized by mandate
type. This table excluded parallel supporting operations and counted only the 66
missions that had primary responsibility for a conflict response.
Table 4.3. Peace Operations Mission Force Capacity and Mandate Outcome
Mission Name

Lead Org

Peacebuilding. N = 20
Mission Size
Troop Capacity

Mean: 10,516
Mean: $33,382

Number of
Troops

Average Troop
Investment*

Mandate Success

Median 8,873
Median: $17,017

UNOSOM II

UN

28,559

$96,885

No

UNAMID

UN

23,448

$11,161

Ongoing

MONUSCO

UN

21,222

$15,963

Ongoing

MONUC-b

UN

20,796

$11,965

Yes

UNAMSIL

UN

17,477

$3,406

Yes

UNMIL

UN

15,250

$4,370

Yes

UNMISS

UN

13,035

$16,481

Ongoing

MINUSCA

UN

12,361

$14,043

Yes

MINUSMA

UN

11,693

$30,240

Ongoing

UNMIS

UN

9,817

$17,552

Yes

UNAMIR II

UN

7,750

$3,444

Yes

ONUMOZ

UN

6,576

$19,132

Yes

ONUCI

UN

6,560

$8,589

Yes
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ONUB

UN

5,665

$12,994

Yes

UNTAG

UN

4,493

$27,084**

Yes

MINURCAT

UN

3,814

$36,712

Yes

MINURCA

UN

1,505

$26,579

Yes

MISSANG-GB

AU

250

$31,106

No

CPAG-SA

OTHER

33

$136,917

Yes

EU SSR

OTHER

8

$143,010

No

Peace Enforcement. N = 9
Mission Size
Mean: 6,715
Troop Capacity Mean: $7,287

Median 2,990
Median: $9,258

AMISOM

AU

22,126

$9,258

Ongoing

ECOMOG-L

REC

12,040

$2,949

Yes

MNJTF

OTHER

10,000

$12,387

Ongoing

ECOMOG-SL

REC

9,000

$3,719

No

AFISMA

AU

2,990

$9,816

No

MICOPAX

AU

2,800

$9,258

No

MISAB

AU

800

$3,906

Yes

FOMUC

OTHER

380

$3,577

Yes

CEN-SAD

REC

300

$10,715

Yes

Peacekeeping. N = 18
Mission Size
Troop Capacity

Mean: 2,702
Mean: $14,205

Median 2,308
Median: $9,011

UNAVEM III

UN

7,294

$9,824

Yes

AMIS 2

AU

6,295

$8,197

Yes

MISCA

OTHER

5,142

$10,205

No

UNISFA

UN

4,529

$3,224

Ongoing
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UNMEE

UN

4,209

$39,841

Yes

ECOMIL

REC

3,556

$4,256

Yes

MONUC-a

UN

3,395

$10,050

Yes

AMIB

AU

2,989

$4,958

Yes

MONUA

OTHER

2,484

$7,559

No

UNAMIR I

UN

2,131

$19,656

No

ECOMICI

REC

1,500

$4,256

Yes

UNAVEM II

UN

1,327

$7,892

No

UNOSOM I

UN

952

$20,490

Yes

SAPSD

AU

750

$56,865

Yes

ECOMOG-GB

REC

712

$4,417

Yes

ECOMIB

REC

700

$10,205

Yes

MAES

OTHER

430

$8,197

Yes

MINURSO

UN

250

$25,606

Ongoing

Peace Monitoring. N = 19
Mission Size
Mean: 87
Median: 43
Troop Capacity Mean: $16,874 Median: $7,111
AMISEC

AU

432

$7,111

Yes

AMIS 1

AU

390

$4,958

Yes

UNOMSIL

UN

139

$13,302

Yes

OAU NMOG II

AU

132

$6,629

Yes

UNOMUR

UN

82

$22,095

No

MINUCI

REC

75

$5,040

Yes

OMIB

AU

67

$7,865

Yes

UNAVEM I

UN

67

$16,833

Yes
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OAU Observer
Mission

AU

43

$3,906

Yes

OAU NMOG I

AU

40

$8,641

No

MIOC / OMIC4

UN

39

$4,958

Yes

JVC

OTHER

30

$50,190

Yes

JMC and IMU

REC

25

$135,113

Yes

OMIC 3

AU

25

$3,577

Yes

OMIC

AU

20

$3,719

No

OAU MOT

AU

15

$9,302

No

OMIC 2

AU

14

$3,577

Yes

UNASOG

UN

9

$4,488**

Yes

OAU Mission to
Western Sahara

UN

not available

$9,302**

Yes

*Average troop investment is the average expense per troop in constant 2016 USD. The figure is
produced by dividing the total nation military expenditure of a TCC by the total armed service members
of that country. The numbers are then combined based on numbers of troops to produce the average
investment into each troop in a mission. Calculations were based on top ten contributors to each
mission.
**Numbers are an estimate based on known TCCs for these missions. Exact mission composition is
unavailable.
Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees (2016); Mullenbach (2018); International
Peace Institute (2018); SIPRI (2018); IISS (1990-2015); Williams (2016).

The analysis found that mandate type had a strong correlation with mission troop
size and capacity. Peacebuilding missions averaged 10,516 troops, peace enforcement
missions 6,715 troops, peacekeeping missions 2,702 troops, and peace monitoring
missions 87 troops. These totals were in line with the hypotheses and demonstrate that
the mission type had a strong influence over the mission size.
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However, size is not the only determinant of force capacity. As previously
discussed, there have been events in peacekeeping history when troops were unable to
execute a task based not on sufficient troop numbers, but on a lack of training and skills
(Jett, 1999; Daniel, 2013). Troop contributing country annual expenditure per solider is
the common measure of the capacity of individual soldiers. This figure captured both the
training and equipping a soldier from a particular nation would receive on average. Table
4.3 also captured the average expenditure per troop for all relevant peace operation
missions. This calculation encapsulated the organic troop training capability of the troop
contributing countries. External support to bolster troop capability is assessed later under
the hypotheses focusing on partnered and supported missions.
The analysis demonstrated disparate findings for average troop capacity for each
mandate type. Peacebuilding operations had the highest average troop capacity based on
a mean and a median analysis. These numbers are reflective of large UN peacebuilding
missions that attract troop contributions from outside the Sub-Saharan region. Peace
enforcement missions had the lowest mean capacity but the second highest median
capacity. Peacekeeping operations were near the average capacity numbers. Peace
monitoring was second highest on average but lowest on a median basis. The
peacebuilding numbers demonstrated a correlation to better trained and equipped troops
being deployed for the complex tasks associated with peacebuilding. The peace
enforcing numbers display the prevalence of peace enforcement missions being
conducted by regional economic community members that are on average less well
funded than troops deployed from outside the Sub-Saharan Africa region. The
97

peacekeeping and monitoring numbers were mainly reflective of the lower per troop
spending norms in earlier years when these missions were more prevalent.
Mandates did impact the size and capacity of troops deployed. Peace Monitoring
missions were the smallest missions in terms of size and had capacities that ranged
widely. Peacekeeping missions had the next largest size and a capacity near the mean for
all operations. Peace enforcement missions had the second largest size but a limited
capacity reflective of their being predominantly sourced from regional economic
communities. Finally, peacebuilding missions were both the largest and had the highest
capacity. These findings validated hypothesis two.
Hypothesis 3: The force capacity determines peace operations outcome. Does
increased force capacity equate better peace operations outcome. Troop numbers and
TCC spending per troop have been closely correlated with mission type. Therefore, it
was necessary to examine these outputs by mandate category. Table 4.4 explains
outcomes categorized by mission type and above or below the median level for number
of troops and per troop capacity. This table excluded parallel supporting operations and
counted only the 66 missions that had primary responsibility for a conflict response.
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Table 4.4. Peace Operations Mission Force Capacity and Mandate: Mission Outcome
Success

Ongoing

Complete

Partial

Larger*

-

7

2

-

Smaller

1

8

1

-

Larger

-

7

2

-

Smaller

1

8

1

-

Peace Monitoring

N = 19

Force Size
(Number of troops)
Troop Investment
($ per solider)

Failure

Peacekeeping

N = 18

Force Size
(Number of troops)

Larger

1

6

1

1

Smaller

3

2

2

2

Larger

2

4

1

2

Smaller

2

4

2

1

Troop Investment
($ per solider)
Peace Enforcement

N=9

Force Size
(Number of troops)

Larger

-

1

1

2

Smaller

-

4

1

-

Larger

-

2

-

2

Smaller

-

3

2

-

Troop Investment
($ per solider)
Peacebuilding

N = 20

Force Size
(Number of troops)

Larger

1

3**

1

5

Smaller

5

3**

2

-

Larger

4

2

3

1

Smaller

2

4***

-

4

Troop Investment
($ per solider)

*Note: Larger = above median, Smaller = at or below median.
** Includes 1 case (of 3 total) where elapsed time since mission closure has not reached the five years of
peace criterion for complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research.
*** Includes 2 cases (of 3 total) where elapsed time since mission closure has not reached the five years
of peace criterion for complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research.
Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees (2016); Mullenbach (2018); International
Peace Institute (2018); World Bank (2018); SIPRI (2018); IISS (1990-2015) Williams (2016).

The comparison of missions that were larger and had more per troop capacity than
the median for their category provided limited patterns from which to draw conclusions.
Peace monitoring missions were marginally more successful if they were smaller and had
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less capacity. Peacekeeping missions were less likely to fail with a larger mission, but
the data otherwise showed no clear pattern. Peace enforcement missions were less likely
to fail if they were better equipped. Peacebuilding operations that had a smaller force
size with more funding produced both the most complete successes and failures. In total,
these results gave no clear guidance on the ideal combination of size and capacity.
Hypothesis 3 was not supported by the findings.
Hypothesis 4: The intervening organization is a predictor of peace operations
outcomes. Different intervening organizations have different restrictions, levels of
experience, and resources at their disposal. Balas (2011) found the UN to be more
experienced and have greater resources. The AU and regional economic communities
were found to be less capable and experienced. Commonly, the African intervenors
initiated an intervention that then transferred to the UN once adequate political will had
developed.
Table 4.5 provides the outcome of peace operations organized by intervenor
group and mandate type. This table excluded parallel supporting operations and counted
only the 66 missions that had primary responsibility for a conflict response.
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Table 4.5. Intervener Group and Peace Operations Mandate: Mission Outcome
Success

Failure

Ongoing

Complete

Partial

Totals

Peace Monitoring

1

4

1

-

6

Peacekeeping

1

3

3

2

9

Peacebuilding

5

6*

1

5

17

Totals

7

13

5

7

32

Peace Monitoring

-

10

2

-

12

Peacekeeping

2

3

-

-

5

Peace Enforcement

-

1

-

1

2

Totals

2

14

2

1

19

Regional Economic
Communities. N = 9
Peacekeeping

1

2

-

1

4

Peace Enforcement

-

3

2

-

5

Totals

1

5

2

1

9

Peace Monitoring

-

1

-

-

1

Peace Enforcement

-

1

-

1

2

Peacebuilding

1

-

2

-

3

Totals

1

2

2

1

6

Totals

11

34

11

10

66

United Nations. N = 32

African Union. N = 19

Ad hoc / Other. N = 6

* Includes 2 cases (of 3 total) where elapsed time since mission closure has not reached the five years of
peace criterion for complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research.
Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees (2016); Mullenbach (2018); United Nations
(2018); Williams (2016).

The data outlined in Table 4.5 does not validate the hypothesis. Different
intervening organizations produced different rates of success in line with their
demonstrated mission type preferences. The UN has played in leading a majority of large
peacebuilding operations that have been generally either successful or are still ongoing.
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The AU has played a leading role in peace monitoring missions that then transitioned to
larger UN missions. As such the AU has produced high rates of partial success with few
completely successful missions. Regional economic communities have conducted many
peace enforcement missions as an intervenor of last resort. This was reflected in their
high rate of failure. Any impact of intervening organization was more closely related to
the mandate type than an impact from the organization. Hypothesis 4 was not supported
by the data.
Hypothesis 5: Robust mandates produce higher peace operation success rates.
Robust mandates describes peace enforcement missions and those peacebuilding
operations mandated to employ deterrent force. These offensive capabilities are designed
to deter attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians, and/or assist in
maintaining law and order. These mandates frequently include language authorizing the
use of all necessary means to defend the mandate or protect civilians. The offensive use
of force differentiates robust from traditional operations (United Nations, 2018).
Robustness is contrasted by traditional peacekeeping that allowed for use of force only in
self-defense of the peacekeeping force itself (Diehl & Balas, 2014).
Table 4.6 provides the outcome of robust and traditional defensive postured
mandates. This table excluded parallel supporting operations and counted only the 66
missions that had primary responsibility for a conflict response.
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Table 4.6. Robust Peace Operation Mandates and Mission Outcome
Success
Complete

Partial

Failure

Ongoing

Total

2

10

3

6

21

Peace Enforcement

-

5

2

1

8

Peacebuilding (Robust)

2

5*

1

5

13

No

9

24

8

4

45

Total

11

34

11

10

66

Robust Mandate?
Yes

* Includes 2 cases (of 3 total) where elapsed time since mission closure has not reached the five years of
peace criterion for complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research.
Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees (2016); Mullenbach (2018); United Nations
(2018); Williams (2016).

Robust missions produced fewer complete or partial successes. Robust
peacebuilding missions produced near average outputs and peace enforcement missions
produced dismal results with no complete successes. These results validated the view
that violence itself cannot address the underlying causes of the conflict; should be
employed as only a part of a strategy; and that peace operations succeed most where there
is peace to be kept (Fortna, 2008). Lower outputs of complete success could be expected
due to the prevalence of deployment to complex conflicts such as the South Sudanese
Civil War and Africa’s World War. However, robust mandates failed to keep pace with
even modest expectations. The data did not support hypothesis 5.
Hypothesis 6: Sequential operations lead to greater peace operation success
rates. The terms sequential, serialized, or transitioned operations all refer to the same
construct. These are operations in which one mission performs duties in before or after
the mission of a different named mission without a break in mandated responsibility for
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the same temporal space (Diehl & Balas, 2014). Table 4.7 compared the outcome of
operations based on whether or not they were part of a serial. This table excluded
parallel supporting operations and counted only the 66 missions that had primary
responsibility for a conflict response.
Table 4.7. Sequential Peace Operations and Mission Outcome
Success

Failure

Ongoing

Complete

Partial

Total

Yes

4

29*

7

7

47

No

7

5

4

3

19

Total

11

34

11

10

66

Sequential Mission?

* Includes 2 cases (of 3 total) where elapsed time since mission closure has not reached the five years of
peace criterion for complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research.
Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees (2016); Mullenbach (2018); United Nations
(2018); Williams (2016).

The results demonstrated that sequential missions produced nearly the same rate
of successful outcome as standalone missions. Sequential missions do stand out in terms
of producing partially successful missions, but were much less likely to result in a
complete success. Serials were nearly as likely as standalone missions to produce a
resilient peace only if the chains of intervention were counted as a whole (i.e. only the
impact from the final mission in the serial). The data did not support hypothesis 6.
The most common pattern was a serial commencing with either a regional
economic community or an AU led mission that then transferred to a UN led mission.
The initial missions were nearly always either peace monitoring or peace enforcement
and deployed to an active conflict without an existent cease fire agreement. The followon missions were mainly peacekeeping operations after a cease-fire was established.
These missions then transferred to a peacebuilding mission after the signing of a peace
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agreement. These UN missions were given robust enforcement authorization in those
conflicts in which violence continued (Derblom, Hagstrom Frisell, & Schmidt, 2008).
While this was the dominant model, there were many other subgroups. In some
operations a temporary enforcement mission was deployed alongside the primary mission
to reduce the violence to a manageable level or to defeat a miscreant group that is
preventing the peace process from progressing. Regardless of the exact pattern, multiple
operations have become the norm (Balas, 2011). In more recent operations it has become
rare for only one peace operation to be deployed to halt or prevent a descent into violence
as evidenced by nine of 12 ongoing or recently closed missions being part of a serial.
Bridging and hand-overs are the two types of sequential operations. Bridging is
when one mission deploys for a relatively short period of time with the express purpose
of preparing for another organization to take over responsibilities (Balas, 2011). The EU
led Operation Artemis was a bridging mission authorized by the UN Security Council to
stabilize an area of the DRC in preparation for the deployment of MONUC. Artemis
deployed for a limited duration with specific goals, and the intention of bridging to
another mission (Diehl & Balas, 2014). Hand-overs differ in that they are a permanent
change of responsibility. Hand-overs can be either from one organization to another.
Such as were the cases of the ECOWAS missions ECOMOG and ECOMICI transferring
responsibility over to the UN missions ECOMIL and ONUCI after the establishment of
peace agreements in the Liberia – Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
War and the First Ivoirian Civil War respectively. Handovers have also occurred within
an organization in response to a changing conditions. This was the case in Rwanda when
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the UN reflagged UNAMIR as UNAMIR II in 1994. UNAMIR II transformed the
mandate from peacekeeping to peacebuilding and added several thousand troops to the
authorized numbers (United Nations, 2001).
Sequential operations have composed a key component of the African peace
operation landscape. The established patterns embolden regional actors to intervene to
prevent an active intra-state conflict from becoming a regional issue. The regional actors
have done so with a tacit understanding that the UN will assist once a cease-fire is in
place (Balas, 2011). This norm has enabled the UN to avoid leading peace enforcement
operations and local actors to utilize their limited resources to the greatest effect.
Hypothesis 7: Force capacity with parallel support missions leads to greater
peace operations success. Parallel peace operations are those that are deployed at the
same time, in the same conflict, but under different lead organizations (Balas, 2011). The
supported or primary operation is mandated to take action focused on the conflict. The
supporting operation is mandated to aid and assist the primary mission. It is an auxiliary
operation that seeks to assist the supported operation by doing what it is not mandated or
not able to accomplish. Most often, the supported mission is a peacebuilding mandate
under the auspices of the UN or AU, while the supporting mission is peace enforcement
or training mission led by either a western power or a regional organization. Parallel
peace operations allow organizations to focus on their strengths and rely on allied
organizations or countries to complement their efforts. Table 4.8 compared the outcomes
of missions that were or were not supported by a parallel supporting peace operation.
Table 4.9 listed each supported mission organized by mandate type. These tables
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excluded parallel supporting operations and counted only the 66 missions that had
primary responsibility for a conflict response.
Table 4.8. Parallel Supporting Peace Operations and Mission Outcomes
Success

Failure

Ongoing

Complete

Partial

Mission Supported by a
Parallel Mission?
Yes

Total

5

14*

-

4

23

No

6

20

11

6

43

11

34

11

10

66

* Includes 2 cases (of 3 total) where elapsed time since mission closure has not reached the five years of
peace criterion for complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research.
Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees (2016); Mullenbach (2018); United Nations
(2018); Williams (2016).

Table 4.9. Peace Operation Parallel Support Relationships and Mandate Types: Mission Outcome
Supported
Mission
ONUB

Type

Supporting Mission

Mission Outcome

PBO

Lead
Org
UN

SAPSD

Complete Success

MINURCAT

PBO

UN

EUFOR-Chad

Complete Success

UNAMSIL

PBO

UN

Operation Palliser & BasilicaSilkman

Complete Success

UNMEE

PKO

UN

OLMEE, AULMEE

Complete Success

MAES

PKO

AU

Operation Democracy in the
Comoros

Complete Success

MONUC-b

PBO

UN

Operation Artemis, EUSEC, and
EUFOR-RD

Partial Success

UNAMIR II

PBO

UN

Operation Turquois

Partial Success

ECOMOG-L

PEO

REC

UNOMIL

Partial Success

MISAB

PEO

OTHER

Unnamed French Operation

Partial Success

AFISMA

PEO

AU

Operation Serval / EUTM

Partial Success
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UNOSOM I

PKO

UN

UNITAF

Partial Success

ECOMICI

PKO

REC

Operation Licorne

Partial Success

ECOMIL

PKO

REC

JTF Liberia

Partial Success

AMIB

PKO

AU

SAPSD

Partial Success

MISCA

PKO

AU

Operation Sangaris

Partial Success

AMIS 2

PKO

AU

EU Support to AMIS2

Partial Success

MINUCI

MON

UN

Operation Licorne

Partial Success

ONUCI

PBO

UN

Operation Licorne

Partial Success*

UNMIL

PBO

UN

JTF Liberia

Partial Success*

MINUSCA

PBO

UN

EUFOR RCA / Operation Sangaris

Ongoing

MINUSMA

PEO

UN

Operation Serval and Barkhane /
EUTM

Ongoing

MNJTF

PEO

OTHER

Operation Barkhane

Ongoing

AMISOM

PEO

AU

EUTM Somalia

Ongoing

* Mission where elapsed time since mission end has not reached the five years of peace criterion for
complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research.
Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees (2016); Mullenbach (2018); United Nations
(2018); Williams (2016).

Missions supported by a parallel operation were more likely to be a complete
success, nearly equally likely to be a partial success, and have never failed. The support
of a parallel mission contributed greatly to producing higher rates of success and lower
rates of failure. Hypothesis seven was validated by the data.
There have been frequent examples of parallel supporting missions. Examples
include the French Operation Barkhane’s support of MINUSMA and the MNJTF; the
U.S. JTF’s support of ECOMIL in Liberia; and numerous EU training missions. The
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practice maximizes the mutual benefit from the parallel efforts of the multiple
organizations.
Nations or organizations may wish to deploy a parallel supporting mission rather
than join an established mission for several reasons. The supporting mission gives
increased control over the organization they support or may gain access to be able to
support national interests. For example, Operation Licorne in Cote d’Ivoire gave the
French military a legal UN mandate to protect French citizens and property during the
First Ivoirian Civil War (French Ministry of Defense, 2015).
The practice also benefits the supported organization. Partnered missions often
open doors to much bilateral assistance that is provided by nations such as the US,
France, Britain, and China (Williams, 2016). For example, in the Central African
Republic War France was not only providing Operation Sangaris as a peace enforcement
mission to stabilize the capital, but also providing training and equipping support to both
MISCA and its successor mission MINUSCA (World Peace Foundation, 2018). It is a
logical leap that a nation that supports a mission with the expense of a supporting mission
will also be more vested in ensuring the mission personnel are capable of accomplishing
their mandate. This support also correlates to mission support on the UN Security
Council if the supporting state is a member.
The practice also enables parties to focus on their capability strengths and
economize peace support. The devision of effort between French and UN forces in Mali
is one such example. French Operation Barkhane forces focus on the employment of
close air support and direct-action special operations forces to remove terrorist leadership
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and assets. MINUSMA peacekeepers focus on controlling territory with large numbers
of troops. The MINUSMA troop contributing nations focus on their ability to field large
numbers of troops necessary for securing large geographical sections and the French are
focus on their capacity to provide limited numbers of highly skilled assets at key times
(Charbonneau, 2017). Parallel support operations enable each intervenor to focus on
their inherent strengths and cover the other’s limitations for mutual benefit.
Hypothesis 8: Force capacity with Western power assistance programs will lead
to greater peace operation success rates. The impacts of two programs were analyzed to
determine their effect on outcome. The first program group was the US African Crisis
Response Initiative (ACRI) program that grew into the present day African Contingency
Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) program (Karis, 2009). The second program
group was the French led program that has grown into the present-day EU African Peace
Facility (APF). These programs each contribute to African peace operations via funding
the training, equipping, and sustainment of troops (European Center for Development
Policy Management, 2018). These programs have been the practical expression of the
rhetoric of “African Solutions to African Problems” with an end goal that African nations
provide the capable troops for African peace operations assisted as necessary with
western funds (Williams, 2016). The impacts of a peace operation being supported by
one or both of these programs was incorporated into Table 4.10. Table 4.11 listed all
missions that received assistance for a US or European Assistance program sorted by
outcome. These tables excluded parallel supporting operations and counted only the 66
missions that had primary responsibility for a conflict response.
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Table 4.10. Peace Operations Assistance Programs and Mission Outcome
Success

Failure

Ongoing

Complete

Partial

Total

Yes

6

16*

2

9

33

No

5

18

9

1

33

Total

11

34

11

10

66

Supported Mission?

* Includes 2 cases (of 3 total) where elapsed time since mission closure has not reached the five years of
peace criterion for complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research.
Sources: Karis (2009); Vic (2017); European Center for Development and Policy Management (2018).

Table 4.11. Assistance Program Support and Mandate Type: Mission Outcome
Supported
Mission
MAES

Type

Lead Org

Assistance Partner

Mission Outcome

PKO

AU

EU

Complete Success

ONUB

PBO

UN

US

Complete Success

UNMEE

PKO

UN

US

Complete Success

UNAMSIL

PBO

UN

US

Complete Success

MINURCAT

PBO

UN

US and EU

Complete Success

ECOMOG-GB

PKO

REC

US and EU

Complete Success

FOMUC

PEO

REC

EU

Partial Success

AMISEC

MON

AU

EU

Partial Success

AFISMA

PEO

AU

EU

Partial Success

MONUC-a

PKO

UN

US

Partial Success

MONUC-b

PBO

UN

US

Partial Success

ECOMIL

PKO

REC

US

Partial Success

UNOMSIL

MON

UN

US

Partial Success

UNMIS

PBO

UN

US

Partial Success
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UNMIL

PBO

UN

US

Partial Success*

ONUCI

PBO

UN

US and EU

Partial Success*

MISAB

PEO

OTHER

US and EU

Partial Success

MINURCA

PBO

UN

US and EU

Partial Success

MISCA

PKO

AU

US and EU

Partial Success

ECOMICI

PKO

REC

US and EU

Partial Success

AMIS 1

MON

AU

US and EU

Partial Success

AMIS 2

PKO

AU

US and EU

Partial Success

OMIB

MON

AU

US

Failure

MICOPAX

PEO

REC

US and EU

Failure

MONUSCO

PBO

UN

US

Ongoing

UNMISS

PBO

UN

US

Ongoing

UNISFA

PKO

UN

US

Ongoing

UNAMID

PBO

UN

US

Ongoing

MINUSCA

PBO

UN

US and EU

Ongoing

ECOMIB

PKO

REC

US and EU

Ongoing

MNJTF

PEO

OTHER

US and EU

Ongoing

MINUSMA

PBO

UN

US and EU

Ongoing

AMISOM

PEO

AU

US and EU

Ongoing

* Mission where elapsed time since mission closure has not reached the five years of peace criterion for
complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research.
Sources: Karis (2009); Vic (2017); European Center for Development and Policy Management (2018).

Missions assisted by a mission support program were slightly more likely to be a
complete success, equally likely to be a partial success, and significantly less likely to fail
when compared to unassisted missions. MICOPAX and OMIB were the only two
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instances of assisted missions failing. Mission assistance programs contributed greatly to
ensuring operations did not fail. Hypothesis six was validated by the data.
Assistance programs supported African peace operations through two main
methods; preparation of deployment and the sustainment of deployed forces. The U.S.
has focused on preparatory train and equip programs. This trend began with the ACRI
and then transitioned to the ACOTA program. These predeployment programs enhanced
the capacity of African troops to conduct peace operations by providing training and
equipment (usually non-lethal) to African forces that would deploy as part of an AU or
UN led peace operation (Karis, 2009). The EU’s African Peace Facility (APF) has
focused on the sustainment and maintenance of African troops in the field (European
Center for Development Policy Management, 2018). Together these programs have
trained, deployed, and sustained African peace operations forces.
ACRI operated from 1997 to 2002 with the intent to support peace operations
without U.S. troops intervening in African conflicts. ACRI trained 9,000 troops from
eight partner nations. ACRI trained troops deployed in support of over 13 different peace
operations (Karis, 2009).
ACRI became ACOTA in 2002. ACOTA trained whole units immediately prior
to deployment. ACOTA also changed the curriculum focus from training on monitoring
and observation tasks to a focus on offensive and defensive military operations more
closely aligned with the needs of enforcement missions (Handy, 2010; Berman, 2002).
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ACOTA trained 353,871 troops, composing 417 units, from 26 different nations
as of 2017 (Rainey, 2018). Today it is a partnership led by the US, but with support and
coordination across US, British, and French governments.
The African Peace Facility (APF) is a funding mechanism that draws funds from
the EU development fund to support the African Peace Security Architecture (APSA).
The APF was developed in response to African leaders’ call for assistance in facilitating
African responses to African conflicts at the 2003 Maputo Conference (African Union,
2018). It was formed in 2004 and began delivering funds in 2007. The APF’s overall
goal is to enhance the capacity and functioning of the APSA by funding peace operations;
developing the capacity of AU and the regional economic communities; and funding
conflict prevention and mediation efforts. The APF has expended 1.9 billion euros from
its inception to 2006 (European Center for Development Policy Management, 2018).
Assistance programs have facilitated African troops performing African peace
operations. Frequently the US led on training and equipping forces via the ACOTA
program and the EU has been the primary funding source of sustainment. These
programs have each assisted the deploying and maintaining African troops in the field.
Hypothesis 9: Force capacity that includes both a parallel supporting mission
and a Western Power assistance program will produce the greatest rates of peace
operations success. My final hypothesis is the fusion of hypotheses six and seven; peace
operations supported by both a parallel supporting mission and a peace operation
assistance program will produce the highest rates of success. The results were compiled
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into Table 4.12. This table excluded parallel supporting operations and counted only the
66 missions that had primary responsibility for a conflict response.
Table 4.12. Peace Operations Assisted by a Mission Support Program and a Parallel Peace
Operation: Mission Outcome
Success

Failure

Ongoing

Complete

Partial

Assisted and Partnered
Mission?
Yes

Total

4

10*

-

4

18

No

7

24

11

6

48

Total

11

34

11

10

66

* Includes 2 cases (of 3 total) where elapsed time since mission closure has not reached the five years
of peace criterion for complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research.
Sources: Karis (2009); Vic (2017); European Center for Development and Policy Management
(2018); Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees (2016); Mullenbach (2018); United Nations
(2018); Williams (2016).

Missions that combined the impacts of partnering with a parallel mission and a
mission support program produced resilient peace at a superior rate to those missions that
do not. Additionally, these missions never failed. These figures demonstrated a pattern
of success related to external support that bolsters the capacity of a peace operation.
Hypothesis eight was sustained by the data.
Summary of Results
My nine hypotheses were developed to test the linkages between conflict,
mandate, intervenor capacity, and outcome. Hypothesis one tested the linkage between
conflict and mandate. Hypothesis two tested the connection between mandate and
intervening force capacity. Hypothesis three tested the relationship between intervenor
force capacity and outcome. Hypotheses four and five examined links between mandate
and outcome. Hypotheses six, seven, eight, and nine examined the impact of various
factors augmenting intervenor force capacity.
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Hypothesis 1, the conflict characteristics determine the peace operation mandate,
was strongly supported. Peace enforcement and peacebuilding operations were more
frequently deployed to medium or highly complex conflicts. Peace monitoring missions
were predominantly deployed to low complexity conflicts and peacekeeping showed no
definitive pattern. Every instance of a peace monitoring or peacekeeping operation
deploying to a medium or highly complex conflict resulted in a transition to a more
robust operation. The data indicated a strong confirmation of hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 2, peace operations mandate determines the force capacity, was
partially supported. Mandates determined the quantity but not the capacity of troops
deployed. Peace Monitoring missions were the smallest missions in terms of size and
had capacities that ranged widely. Peacekeeping missions had the next largest size and a
capacity near the mean for all operations. Peace Enforcement missions had the second
largest size but a limited capacity reflective of their being predominantly sourced from
regional economic communities. Finally, peacebuilding missions were both the largest
and had the highest capacity. These findings predominantly supported hypothesis two.
Hypothesis 3, the force capacity determines peace operations outcome, was not
supported. The comparison of missions that were larger and had more per troop capacity
than the median for their category provided limited patterns from which to draw
conclusions. Peace monitoring missions were marginally more successful if they were
smaller and had less capacity. Peacekeeping missions were less likely to fail with a
larger mission, but the data otherwise showed no clear pattern. These results presented
no clear indication of an ideal combination of size and capacity.
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Hypothesis 4, the intervening organization is a predictor of peace operations
outcomes was not supported by the data. No significant differentiation was found
between organizations when mission type was accounted for. The UN has played in
leading a majority of large peacebuilding operations that have been generally either
successful or are still ongoing. The AU has played a leading role in peace monitoring
missions that later transitioned to larger UN missions. As such the AU has produced high
rates of partial success with few completely successful missions. Regional economic
communities have conducted many peace enforcement missions as an intervenor of last
resort. This was reflected in their high rate of failure.
Hypothesis 5, robust mandates produce higher peace operation success rates, was
not supported. Robust missions rarely produced a resilient peace and performed no better
at producing partial successes than non-robust operations. Peace enforcement mission
performance was the most egregious having never produced a resilient peace without first
transitioning to a peacebuilding mission. My fifth hypothesis was not supported by the
data.
Hypothesis 6, sequential operations lead to greater peace operation success rates,
was not supported by the data. Serialized conflicts failed as often as standalone conflicts
and produced low rates of complete success. Serials were as likely as standalone
missions to produce resilient peace only if considering only the final mission in a serial.
Therefore, the hypothesis was not supported.
Hypothesis 7, force capacity with parallel support missions leads to greater peace
operations success, was strongly supported. Missions supported by a parallel operation
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were more likely to be a complete success, nearly equally likely to be a partial success,
and have never failed. The support of a parallel mission contributed greatly to producing
higher rates of success and lower rates of failure.
Hypothesis 8, force capacity with Western power assistance programs will lead to
greater peace operation success rates, was strongly supported. Missions assisted by a
mission support program were slightly more likely to be a complete success, equally
likely to be a partial success, and significantly less likely to fail when compared to
unassisted missions.
Hypothesis 9, force capacity that includes both a parallel supporting mission and a
Western Power assistance program will produce the greatest rates of peace operations
success, was strongly supported. Missions that combined the impacts of partnering with
a parallel support mission and a mission assistance program produced resilient peace at a
superior rate to those missions that did not and have never failed. These figures
demonstrated a pattern of success related to external support that bolsters the capacity of
a peace operation. Hypothesis nine was strongly supported by the data.
Combining insights gained from multiple hypotheses led to several conclusions.
First, the conflict complexity study conducted to examine hypothesis 2 contextualized the
results of all subsequent hypotheses. Serialized were on average deployed to much more
challenging situations that standalone operations. Serialized operations on average
produced similar outcomes in spite of this headwind. Similarly, robust missions’ failure
to establish peace at a superior rate to traditional missions is less surprising when the
complexity of conflicts peace enforcement and peace building missions were deployed to
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are considered. Robust missions were deployed at higher rates to high and medium
complex conflicts than either peace monitoring or peacekeeping missions. One would
therefore expect the failure of robust missions to be more dramatic than observed.
Similarly, the assessment that more capacity and size do not equate greater success fails
to acknowledge that larger and more complex missions were deployed to conflicts more
likely destined for failure. Therefore, the lack of definitive pattern based on force size
and capacity can be interpreted as capacity overcoming adverse conditions to achieve
results on par with conflicts that exhibit more favorable conditions.
Differing conclusions on the importance of force capacity was a second overall
conclusion. Augmented capacity (hypotheses 7, 8, and 9), but not greater endemic
capacity (hypothesis 3), produced greater outcomes. The non-support of hypotheses 3
and 4 indicated robust mandates implemented by capable intervenors does not make a
panacea for success. However, the strong support for hypotheses 6, 7, and 8
demonstrated that missions that received assistance and partnered support greatly
improved outcomes. This may be due to the targeted nature of training and equipping
under mission assistance programs. A TCCs per soldier capacity did not assess if a
soldier’s training and equipment was specifically targeted to mission requirements.
However, assistance programs, notably ACOTA, tailored training and equipment to
mission requirements (Karis, 2009).
Peace enforcement missions’ utility was linked to specific circumstances. Great
success was realized in the international responses to conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra
Leone, Liberia, and others when peace enforcement missions were deployed as a parallel
119

supporting mission in support of a larger peace building mission. These supporting
missions produced conditions conductive to peacebuilding where they did not previously
exist. Even in the case of Somalia, UNITAF was able to temporarily create the
conditions in which UNOSOM could have succeeded (United Nations, 2001). If there is
no peace in place peace must be established but, force must be targeted to specific
objectives in support of a larger strategy.
A final takeaway was that more recent missions were characterized as more
complex conflicts being addressed with those types of interventions shown to produce the
greatest rates of success. Half of current or recently closed missions had a parallel
supporting operation and 11 of 12 benefited from an assistance program. Essentially,
operations post-2015 have evolved towards those practices seen to better produce
resilient peace. The hope is that these most complex of conflicts, such as Africa’s World
War, will end in similar fashion to the Liberia-LURD war that was nearly equitable in its
violence at the highpoint of the war.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
Introduction
What factors have led to successful outcomes in international peace operations
conducted in Sub Saharan African countries? What factors explain mission failure? I
proposed a basic theory of peace operations that linked conflict conditions to mandate
design to the capability of an intervening force deployed for mission implementation
developed from arguments and empirical results of previous research.
Data on 86 peace operations that occurred in 23 African states covering 33
separate conflict periods between 1990 and 2015 was analyzed. My main findings
showed that mandates were derived from conflict assessments and determined the size of
intervening force required. The results also indicated that neither the size of an
intervening force, nor the lead-organization, nor mandate robustness (offensive
deterrence capacity), nor sequencing of operations were predictors of mission success or
failure. However, implementation forces that included parallel support operations and/or
mission assistance from Western great powers had higher levels of successful outcomes.
Missions were distributed between host countries, conflict complexities, mandate
types, intervening organizations, and produced varied outcomes. 38 peace operations
were deployed to 14 high complexity conflicts in eight countries. 30 peace operations
were deployed to 11 medium complexity conflicts in nine countries. 18 peace operations
were deployed to eight low complexity conflicts in seven countries. Mission leadership
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varied. The UN led 33 missions, the AU or OAU led 21 missions, regional economic
communities led nine, and individual countries or ad hoc coalitions led 21 other
operations. 14 missions were still ongoing on April 20, 2019 (the cutoff date for this
research). Three successful missions could only be partially evaluated due to the
temporal period selected for this study. 20 missions were parallel supporting missions;
deployed to compliment the efforts of 23 supported peace operations. The outcome of
parallel supporting missions was measured in the success or failure of the mission they
supported. 47 of the 66 non-supporting missions were part of a sequential series while 19
were standalone missions. Outcome varied with 16 missions completely successful, 44
partially successful, 12 failed, and 14 missions either ongoing or recently closed.
Completely and partially successful missions together composed 60 of 75 completed
missions. 20% of missions failed.
Discussion
Peace operations were successful in some countries, but not in others. Some
countries such as Namibia and South Africa seemed destined for success and succeeded.
They both had a signed peace agreement, higher than regional average GDP per capita,
and relatively low annual conflict related deaths prior to peace operation deployment.
Other countries seemed destined for failure and failed. Angola twice returned to war
during the presence of a peace operation and finally found peace in the absence of a
peace operation. Angola suffered external support to rebel forces, the presence of readily
lootable minerals, high levels of violence, and a moderate GDP per capita. However,
some missions succeeded in the face of great challenges. Missions deployed to Liberia
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and Sierra Leone faced open conflict with no peace agreement, the presence of readily
lootable minerals, external support to rebel forces, relatively low GDPs per capita, and
extreme rates of battlefield deaths. However, peace operations proved ultimately
successful in both nations. These examples illustrate that success or failure could not be
predicted on the conflict characteristics alone.
Mission outputs varied with mandate type. Peacebuilding missions, especially
larger multidimensional missions, produced the greatest rates of establishing a resilient
peace. Small peacebuilding missions with limited objectives such as EU-SSR and
ECOMIG (both in Guinea Bissau) frequently failed. However, larger UN led missions
such as ONUMOZ in Mozambique, ONUB in Burundi, and UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone
succeeded so long as international will to support was maintained. Even UNOSOM II in
Somalia reduced the severity of the Second Somali War. However, the mission withdrew
in failure after international supporters including the United States withdrew support.
Overall peacebuilding missions produced seven complete successes, seven partial
successes, four failures, and have eight ongoing missions.
Peacekeeping missions were the second most successful mission type.
Peacekeeping missions led to resilient peace including SAPSD in Burundi, MAES in the
Comoros Islands, UNMEE in Ethiopia and Eritrea, and ECOMOG-GB in Guinea Bissau.
These missions all benefited from the presence of a peace agreement pre-deployment and
limited objectives in line with a medium or low complexity conflict. MONUA in Angola
and UNAMIR I in Rwanda were examples of peacekeeping failures. These missions
each failed to prevent the outbreak of a new war. They were each limited due to the
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absence of a credible deterrent threat. Overall peacekeeping missions produced five
complete successes, ten partial successes, two failures, and three ongoing missions.
Peace monitoring missions produced the greatest rate of overall success, but only
once produced a resilient peace without the transition to a larger mission. UNASOG in
Chad was the one example of a complete success. UNASOG’s mission was limited in
scope and took place after the signing of a peace agreement in an intrastate conflict.
Other missions generally either served as a tripwire to the deployment of a larger mission
or saw a return to violence shortly following mission withdrawal. Overall peace
monitoring missions produced two complete success, 16 partial successes, and three
failures.
Peace enforcement missions only produced a completely successful mission when
acting as a parallel supporting mission. Complete failures included MICOPAX in the
Central African Republic and ECOMOG-SL in Sierra Leone. These missions were failed
regional economic community attempts to bolster embattled governments. Partial
successes included multiple missions in the Central African Republic and AFISMA in
Mali. These missions were most notable in their transitions to larger UN missions which
are ongoing. A majority of peace enforcement missions were deployed to high
complexity conflicts. Overall peace enforcement missions produced two complete
successes, 11 partial successes, three failures, and three missions are ongoing.
Outcome by mandate type yields multiple conclusions. Peacebuilding missions
are the most likely to establish a resilient peace. Peacebuilding missions frequently
succeed in their focus on the underlying conflict conditions. Peacekeeping missions
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produce positive outcomes in those conflicts which have favorable conditions including
an existing peace agreement. Peace monitoring and enforcement missions lack the ability
to produce a resilient peace but can serve as a tripwire to a peacebuilding or
peacekeeping mission.
Organic force composition and structure analysis did not yield resolute answers.
Mandate type was a predictor of force composition, capacity, and lead organization.
However, mission success corelated to neither mission size nor the military expenditures
of troop contributing countries. Similarly, there was no clear correlation between lead
intervening organization and mission outcome.
Western great power support was found to be extremely beneficial. The
deployment of a parallel supporting mission or support from a mission assistance
program each dramatically improved mission outcome rates. Parallel supporting
missions are those deployed to complement another peace operation. 17 parallel
supporting missions were led by Western powers. The missions they supported never
failed. Similarly, the presence of a mission assistance program demonstrated a marked
impact on mission outcome. The United States’ ACRI/ACOTA and the EU’s APF each
improved outcomes. Assisted missions that have closed produced six complete
successes, 16 partial successes, and twice failed. The greatest rates of success were
found to be those missions that had both a parallel mission support and the assistance of a
mission support program.
In an optimistic note, recent missions were characterized by those traits that led to
greater rates of success. Half of ongoing or recently closed operations had a parallel
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supporting operation and 11 of 12 were assisted via an assistance program. Operations
post-2015 evolved towards those practices seen to better produce resilient peace. The
hope will be that these most complex of conflicts, such as Africa’s World War in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Tuareg Rebellion in Mali, will be ended in
similar fashion to the Liberia-LURD war that was nearly equitable in its violence at the
highpoint of the war.
My findings indicate that conflict complexity alone is not a definitive predictor of
success or failure. The positive examples of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d’Ivoire
demonstrate the potential for a multifaceted, complex, enduring commitment from the
international community to end complex conflicts. The example of UNOSOM II in
Somalia demonstrates the failure brought about by the withdrawal of international
commitment. The failure of the OMIC peace monitoring mission in the Comoros Islands
demonstrates that an extremely limited response can fail in even the lowest complexity
conflict. In summation, conflict complexity is a predictor of the required response but
not the expected outcome of a peace operation.
The successful intervention into the Liberia-LURD War was an outlying case
worthy of note. The conflict’s primary determinant was credible deterrence provided by
the overwhelming force of the 4,350 U.S. Marines of JTF Liberia (Sirleaf, as cited in
Strasser, 2017). The overwhelming force provided adequate temporal and physical space
for local and UN led peacebuilding efforts to take root. Intervention into the LiberiaLURD War was a unique case of a peace enforcement mission producing a resilient
peace.
126

My study and its conclusions had many overlaps of agreements and
disagreements with the existent literature. I agreed that peace operations generate
positive results (Dorussen, 2014; Fortna, 2008; Sambanis, 2008). I found that a majority
of intervened conflicts with known outcomes ended peacefully and had low rates of
conflict recidivism.
My findings provided possible mitigation of issues raised by those who cite
intervenor capability as the primary challenge to peace operation success. Numerous
studies have argued that force capability is key to operations success (Bellamy &
Williams, 2013; Jett, 1999; Daniel, 2013). Missions that employed capacity support
mechanisms succeeded at a high rate regardless of the endemic capability found in the
troop contributing countries. Other studies have similarly shown how missions that
combine a traditional UN operation with the deployment of soldiers from a western or
regional power augment capacity (Daniel, 2013; Martin-Brule, 2012). My findings
indicate that capacity challenges can be overcome through the deployment of parallel
supporting missions and the implementation of mission support programs.
I concur with Fortna’s (2008) and Sambanis’ (2008) conclusions that numbers are
largely irrelevant. The mission will either be large enough to perform the task or will
serve as a trip-wire to a more capable mission if the mission is prioritized. Failures of
missions in Africa have occurred due to insufficient funding, troop numbers, and support
to troops in the field (Badmus, 2015). However, if the conflict is seen as important
interventions will receive additional support and capacity. For example, the early failures
of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone transitioned to successful missions by the
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United States and Great Brittan respectively. Missions will generally transition to larger
more capable forces until the correct match of mandate and intervenor capabilities are
realized.
My findings partially contradicted those studies that determined that robust
mandates negatively affect the success or failure of peace operations (Holmqvist, 2014;
Rhoads, 2016; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Nascimento, 2018). I agree that deterrence
force does not guarantee success and negative outcomes have resulted from primary
missions employing robust mandates. However, parallel supporting operations with
robust mandates have been able to create the conditions for peace where they did not
otherwise exist (Sandler, 2017; Sambanis, 2008; Thakur, 2014). The efforts in Sierra
Leone, Liberia, and Cote d’Ivoire were among the seminal examples of the use of force
to create the conditions for peace. My findings indicated that the credible threat or use of
force is a key element to conflict transformation, but only if nested in a peacebuilding
effort.
Studies of peace operations have been dominated by case studies or comparisons
of select similar cases. My study has contributed a breadth of analysis to the
understanding of peace operations and the factors affecting their outcome. My study has
taken an expansive 25-year view of peace operations in Sub-Saharan Africa. My review
of 86 operations has yielded conclusions on the connections between conflict, mandate,
and intervening force and empirically demonstrated the impact of parallel support
missions and assistance programs. My findings were not revolutionary. They agreed
with most existent literature. The findings contribute in that I add supporting data to
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lessons originally drawn from limited case numbers. Policy makers and mission
designers should recognize the demonstrated importance of support mechanisms which
augments capacity organic to the mission itself.
Limitations of Study
My study took a macro approach to African peace operations. I examined all
Sub-Saharan peace operations that occurred from 1990 through 2015. Commonalities of
those interventions that did or did not achieve a peaceful outcome were identified.
However, results were more correlation than causation. My data and results are useful
for informing policy decisions, but they are aggregates that cannot provide a fail-safe
model suitable to all conditions.
My study did not address the perspectives of the parties to the conflict. I focused
upon intervening organizations, peace operations forces, and assistance partners. I did
not address the role of those living with the conflict and their effect upon an
intervention’s success or failure. A bottom-up analysis would greatly compliment this
study. It is after all, local actors who choose whether to return to war (Whalan, 2010).
My study was also limited in that I did not analyze the actions of missions once
on the ground. Outcomes are inevitably influenced by what an actor does or does not do.
My study evaluated the inputs and a measure of potential in place of actual actions.
Potential additional variables to refine results could include violence directed toward the
intervening force and/or characteristics of force leadership.
My variables relating to conflict complexity are based upon best available
information, but present two issues. First, factors leading to conflict recidivism are a
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proxy for factors challenging the success of a peace operation. They are not a direct
measure. Additionally, to declare a conflict highly complex leads to the false impression
the conflict can only end with proper intervention. This is demonstratably false as the
end of the Second Somali War and the Angola War of the Cities each came after the
withdrawal of international peace operations.
Additionally, my findings only examine two trends among many which augment
mission capacity. Pre-deployment training standards have been under development for
UN missions. There were elements of the African Peace Facility not examined including
the development of peacekeeping training centers. An analysis of what proportion of
troops received said training, equipping, and/or sustainment as well as an expanded list of
programs may have better captured great power support to peace operations.
My data was limited to that available in published databases, organizational
websites, and academic journals. UN operations have treasure troves of data stored on
UN websites and available from the International Peace Institute Peacekeeping Database.
This information includes mandate texts, troop numbers and composition by month, and
others. However, non-UN missions lack a similar resource. I relied upon journal articles,
information from the Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management Project conflict
narratives, and that published in Williams’ (2016) War and Conflict in Africa.
Information on non-UN led missions remained challenging, but was adequate for the
compilation of peace operation data. The compilation of data from these sources enabled
me to make comparisons between the interventions, but did not permit a full
understanding of the conflict conditions and the causative factors at play.
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Future Research
My study pointed to several areas for further research. Western great power
assistance played a key role in improving outcomes. How and where should this support
be directed, and to what level of magnitude, should be more thoroughly examined.
Potential answers to “how” include whether the tangible support, political votes at the
UN Security Council, or legitimacy conveyed by support causes the greatest impact in
outcome. Additionally, what support produces the greatest impact? Future research
should examine whether training, equipping, or financial support has the greatest impact.
Another direction for study is the change within operations. My study accounted
for a mission’s overall mandate and the force at its largest point. This accounts for
neither the month to month changes to troop levels nor mandate shifts. Future studies
should examine specific missions on a month to month basis seeking to find relationships
between the deployment of specific capabilities or troops who have completed a specific
training set and the overall rates of violence in a conflict. These intra-conflict stats may
demonstrate more precisely the impacts from various support programs.
Additionally, the support provided by private military contractors should be
examined. Sierra Leone, Angola, and other conflicts in Africa have employed private
military contractors. Some have argued that they have been a stabilizing force against
rebel movements in a similar fashion to peace enforcing parallel supporting operations
(Ucko, 2016). A study as to the impact of their employment in an intra-state conflict
would be welcome.

131

International peace operations deployed to reduce conflict in African states have
had a positive impact. Western great power assistance programs drastically improved
outcomes. Overall missions with Western support eliminated failure and produced higher
rates of stable peace outcomes. Complex conflicts were overcome in Sierra Leone,
Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire and others via a combined effort involving the UN, the AU,
regional economic communities, and incorporating great power support. Perhaps the key
conclusion is that peace in Africa requires a partnership between regional players and the
broader international community.
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APPENDIX: OPERATION AND ORGANIZATION NAMES AND ACRONYMS
Mission Acronym

Full Mission Name

AFISMA

African Led International Support Mission to Mali

AMIB

African Mission in Burundi

AMIS 1

AU Mission in Sudan

AMIS 2

AU Mission in Sudan

AMISEC
AMISOM

AU Mission for Support to the Elections in the
Comoros
AU Mission in Somalia

CEN-SAD

Communauté des Etats Sahélo-Sahariens

CPAG-SA
ECOMIB

Commonwealth Peacekeeping Assistance Group –
South Africa
ECOWAS Mission in Bissau

ECOMICI

ECOWAS Mission in Cote d'Ivoire

ECOMIL

ECOWAS Mission in Liberia

ECOMOG-GB

ECOWAS Monitoring Group

ECOMOG-L

ECOWAS Monitoring Group

ECOMOG-SL

ECOWAS Military Observer Group

EU SSR

EU Security Sector Reform in Guinea Bissau

EU Support to AMIS 2

EU Support to AMIS

EUFOR RCA

EU Military Operation in the CAR

EUFOR-Chad

EU Military Operation in Chad
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EUFOR-RD

EU Force in the DRC

EUSEC-CONGO
EUTM Mali

EU Mission to Provide Advice and Assistance for
Security Sector Reform in the DRC
EU Training Mission in Mali

EUTM Somalia

EU Training Mission in Somalia

FOMUC

Multinational Force in the Central African Republic

JMC and IMU
JTF Liberia

Joint Military Commission / International Monitoring
Unit
Joint Task Force Liberia

JVC

Joint Verification Committee

MAES

Electoral and Security Mission to the Comoros

MICOPAX
MINUCI

Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central
Africa
UN Mission in Cote d'Ivoire

MINURCA

UN Mission in the Central African Republic

MINURCAT

UN Mission in Chad and the Central African Republic

MINURSO

UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

MINUSCA

MIOC / OMIC4

UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission
in the CAR
UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission
in Mali
Observer Mission in the Comoros

MISAB

Inter-African Force in the Central African Republic

MISCA

Transitioned to MINUSCA

MISSANG-GB

Angolan Military Mission in Guinea-Bissau

MINUSMA
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MNJTF vs Boko Haram

Multinational Joint Task Force

MONUA

UN Observer Mission in Angola

MONUC-a

UN Organization Mission in the DRC

MONUC-b

United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC

MONUSCO

UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC

OAU Mission to Western
Sahara
OAU MOT

OAU Mission to Western Sahara

OAU NMOG I

OAU Neutral Military Observer Group

OAU NMOG II

OAU Neutral Military Observer Group II

OAU Observer Mission

OAU Observer Mission

OLMEE, AULMEE
OMIB

OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea/ AU Liaison
Mission to Ethiopia-Eritrea
Observer Mission in Burundi

OMIC

Observer Mission in Comoros

OMIC 2

Observer Mission in the Comoros

OMIC 3

Observer Mission in the Comoros

ONUB

UN Mission in Burundi

ONUCI

UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire

ONUMOZ

UN Operation in Mozambique

OAU Military Observer Team

Operation Artemis / IEMF International Emergency Multinational Force
Operation Barkhane

Operation Barkhane
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Operation Basilica and
Silkman
Operation Democracy in
the Comoros
Operation Licorne

Operation Basilica and Silkman

Operation Palliser

Operation Palliser

Operation Sangaris

Operation Sangaris

Operation Serval

Operation Serval

Operation Turquoise

Operation Turquoise

SAPSD

South African Protection Service Detachment

UNAMID

UN/AU Mission in Darfur

UNAMIR I

UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda

UNAMIR II

UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda II

UNAMSIL

UN Mission in Sierra Leone

UNASOG

UN Azouzou Strip Observer Group

UNAVEM I

UN Angola Verification Mission

UNAVEM II

UN Angola Verification Mission II

UNAVEM III

UN Angola Verification Mission III

UNISFA

UN Interim Security Force for Abyei Area

UNITAF

Unified Task Force (Operation Restore Hope)

UNMEE

UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea

UNMIL

UN Mission in Liberia

Operation Democracy in the Comoros
Operation Licorne
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UNMIS

UN Mission in Sudan

UNMISS

UN Mission in South Sudan

UNOMIL

UN Observer Mission in Liberia

UNOMSIL

UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone

UNOMUR

UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda

UNOSOM I

UN Operation in Somalia I

UNOSOM II

UN Operation in Somalia II

UNTAG

UN Transition Assistance Group
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Organization / Country
Acronym
ACOTA

Organization / Country Name
African Contingency Operations Training Assistance

ACRI

African Crisis Response Initiative

APF

African Peace Facility

ASPA

African Peace and Security Architecture

AU

African Union

CAR

Central African Republic

DRC

Democratic Republic of the Congo

ECCAS

Economic Community of Central African States

ECOWAS

Economic Community of West African States

EU

European Union

LCB

Lake Chad Basin

LURD

Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy

MNJTF

Multi-National Joint Task Force

OAU

Organization for African Unity

REC

Regional Economic Community

SWAPO

South-West Africa Peoples’ Organization

UN

United Nations
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